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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1

The Marshall Center and the Future Rocket
The future of space travel is evolving as NASA designs the nation’s next

generation launch system that will provide the capability for human exploration
missions beyond low-Earth orbit (i.e., to the moon, Mars and beyond). NASA’s
Marshall Space Flight Center (referred to hereafter as the Marshall Center) is
leading the design, development and delivery of the most powerful rocket ever
built – the Space Launch System or SLS. This advanced, heavy-lift vehicle will
launch humans and robotic explorers deeper into the solar system than ever
before.
This is not unfamiliar territory for NASA and the Marshall Center. The
Marshall Center is an experienced developer and integrator of launch systems
possessing the engineering capabilities to take hardware from concept to
preliminary design to operation in space. Prior to the SLS Program, the Marshall
Center was responsible for the design and development of the Ares I and Ares V
launch vehicles within another national-level program called Constellation. The
Marshall Center was an active participant in the first, successful dedicated vehicle
and ground test flight of the Ares I-X rocket prior to the cancellation of the
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Constellation Program. Similarities between the Constellation Program and SLS
Program are:
 Share a primary goal of enabling human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit
(LEO)
 Share a common service intent with rockets under design to be the Space
Shuttle’s successor
 Share a distributed team approach across multiple NASA Centers
 Share a common charge to reconstitute systems engineering capacity within
NASA’s human spaceflight community to smoothly transition the human
spaceflight workforce to the next generation of capabilities and to lay the
foundation of a program that will be cost-effective and sustainable into the far
future (Rhatigan, et al., 2011).
While large scale, distributed programs like Constellation afforded
advantages such as accessibility to the entire Agency’s technical depth, skills and
expertise, best practices and approaches, and state-of-the-art NASA facilities and
infrastructures across the nation, there were also some pivotal disadvantages
(Constellation Lessons Learned, 2011). There was persistent political tension
between what was most efficient for the Constellation Program versus what was
best for a particular NASA Center to sustain or grow its current role. The large
dispersed teams at ten NASA Centers led to unclear roles and responsibilities and
exposed cultural differences. With each Center documenting Constellation
requirements, procedures and processes – oftentimes duplicative and
contradictory - the contractors had difficulty distinguishing final decisions
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coming from the Agency, since direction could come from the program or the
independent technical authority.
1.2

Lessons from Constellation
In 2011, NASA published an executive summary containing lessons

learned collected from the aerospace workforce who contributed to the
Constellation Program. From the key findings, the most difficult and most
persistent challenges involved cost, schedule, and organization (Constellation
Lessons Learned, 2011). While the NASA Agency is renowned for technical
prowess, senior managers in flagship programs can be faced with multitude of
non-technical challenges for which they have far less training or preparation. In
this respect, using Constellation as a comparative and its lessons learned can
provide invaluable sources of insight (Constellation Lessons Learned, 2011). For
the purposes of this study, three major lessons learned pertaining to roles and
responsibilities, decision-making, and communication are listed and analyzed as
the basis for the research objectives within this study.
The clarity of RR&A for the Constellation Program was degraded by the
combined effects of the wide distribution of program responsibilities via the “10
Healthy Centers” policy, the multi-decadal phasing of the program development,
and the assumption of traditionally understood roles from the Space Shuttle
heritage component development. There is no formula or checklist for clear
RR&A in an Agency-wide flagship program, but RR&A can be improved by
periodic functional examination, by either combining like tasks or separating
functions by needs (Constellation Lessons Learned, 2011).
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The clarity and effectiveness of the decision-making processes for the
Constellation Program were driven by the same events as for the RR&A
mentioned above. In spite of constant attention from senior management, the
decision-making process remained a persistent issue that only marginally
improved over time. In a program of this magnitude, attempts to balance timely
decision-making at the appropriate levels, consider tactical viewpoints and clearly
delineate accountability for execution, while keeping all stakeholders informed
and included, often left someone dissatisfied. For any large scope, distributed
program like Constellation, it is recommended to invest the time and energy to
define a comprehensive strategic decision process that includes all affected
parties. Project Planning is vitally important (Constellation Lessons Learned,
2011).
As mentioned previously, Constellation’s widespread 10-Center team
created a true communications challenge. While countless assessments and
prevailing programmatic wisdom indicate a small, centrally located team is the
most efficient way to build a complex element, Constellation did not have that
luxury. Thus, this posed RR&A, decision-making and communication issues.
The Constellation Program incorporated Information Technology (IT) tools and
applications (telecom, WebEx, Integrated Collaborative Environment (ICE)
portal, etc.) extensively to enhance the flow of information (Constellation Lessons
Learned, 2011).
The vast aerospace industry as well as scientists and academics across the
globe are watching NASA, tracking its progress in the development of the SLS
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heavy-lift vehicle. Congress and the U.S. taxpayers are also closely observing its
progress and alignment with budget and schedule constraints. On the heels of the
abruptly cancelled Constellation Program in 2010, with not one, but two test
flights accomplished for the Ares I-X rocket and Orion crew vehicle,
NASA/Marshall Center must learn vital lessons from Constellation (and other
large-scale human spaceflight programs such as Apollo, Space Shuttle,
Shuttle/Mir and International Space Station (ISS)) and adequately apply them to
the management and development of the SLS Program.
1.3

Research Questions
Based on the nature of the responsibility and the watchful eye of the

nation on NASA in the development of the SLS launch vehicle, the following
questions will be researched and analyzed in this study:
 Is the SLS Program applying these lessons learned from the Constellation
Program to its decision making and communication processes?
 Does the SLS Program balance timely decision making at appropriate levels?
 Does the SLS Program make strategic decisions and have a comprehensive
decision process?
 How effective is the SLS Program at making decisions?
 Does a decision making process really matter?
 How are decisions made on the SLS Program?
 Are the decisions made by group consensus or directed by management?
 How is the communication flow within the program?
 Are all parties included in the decision making and communication process?
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Consequently the resulting research objectives from the above questions are:
 Define strategic decisions
 Define the dimensions of strategic decision making
 Investigate how decisions are made
 Investigate the effectiveness of the strategic decision making process
 Determine if decision making process matters
 Assess communication flow within each objective listed
To thoroughly investigate and study the research objectives, the SLS
Program Change Request (CR) change control process served as the surrogate for
insight and data collection pertaining to decision making and communication
patterns and processes.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Decision Definition
What is a decision? The Merriam-Webster dictionary (2014) defines a

decision as a determination arrived at after consideration. Mintzberg, et al. (1976)
defined a decision as a commitment to a future action. Decisions are assumed to
be clearly distinguishable and discrete events. Decision makers often can identify
discrete decision points and feel a sense of completion at making a decision.
However, decision boundaries are not always as clear as first thought [or
assumed], and there is not always agreement on what events are involved in a
given decision. Almost every decision involves a series of activities and choices
nested in choices of wider scope, rather than a single simple choice (Poole &
Hirokawa, 1996).
2.1.1

Strategic Decision Definition
One type of decision is a strategic decision. Strategic decisions express

adaptation to opportunities, threats, constraints, and other characteristics of the
environment (Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998). Strategic decisions have
been described as committing substantial resources, setting precedents and
creating waves of lesser decisions (Mintzberg, et al., 1976); as ill-structured, non7

routine and complex (Schwenk, 1988); and as substantial, unusual and allpervading (Hickson, et al., 1986). The significance of strategic decisions means
that there is more at stake for those who stand to gain or lose from the decisions in
terms of material or reputational consequences (Child, Elbanna, & Rodrigues,
2010).
2.1.2 Strategic Decision Schemes
Common decision making schemes with strategic decisions are consensus,
majority vote, and decision by authority. Other methods include minority
decision, where a subgroup decides, with or without the goodwill of the other
group members; bargaining, arbitration, and compromise are also possibilities
(Brilhart & Galanes, 1992; Gulley & Leathers, 1977; Jensen & Chilberg, 1991;
Johnson & Johnson, 1987). When compared to uninstructed groups, consensus
decision making produced better quality decisions but entailed more time (Hall &
Watson, 1970; Nemiroff & King, 1975; Nemiroff, et al., 1976). Consensus is the
best evidence of widespread commitment to a decision and without the
commitment the decision has little chance of being effectively carried out.
Moreover, the sometimes taxing process of working toward commitment yields
not just commitment but better decisions (Nickols, 2005).
2.1.3

Strategic Decision Impact
By implication, strategic decisions are complex and involve a high degree

of uncertainty (Mador, 2000). Strategic decisions, with important impact, attract
the collective attention of more layers in an organizational hierarchy. This idea
corroborated Dutton, et al. (1989), who argue that issues with great magnitude of
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impact imply high interconnectedness with other relevant issues. Therefore, such
issues attract more collective attention and thus result in higher hierarchical
decentralization and lateral communication (Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers,
1998). These results align with Dean and Sharfman (1993a) and Stein (1980),
who suggest that the perceived magnitude of impact of a decision is among the
strongest explanatory variables of decision making behavior, as decision makers
act more comprehensive or rationally when a decision implies important
consequences (Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998).
2.2

Decision Dimensions
As mentioned previously, a decision is a determination made after some

consideration. Decision making is not a unitary event, but a complex social
process involving the directing of attention, discovery, designing courses of
action, evaluating alternatives and choosing among them (Simon 1965; Oliver &
Roos, 2005). Two concepts – procedural rationality and politics – have clearly
played central roles in the organizational decision making literature (Allison,
1971; Carter 1971; Cyert & March, 1963; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988;
Eisenhardt & Zbaraki, 1992; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Hart, 1992; March &
Simon, 1958; Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer,
1981; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). Substantial research by Dean and Sharfman
(1993a) has demonstrated that procedural rationality and politics are distinct
dimensions of the strategic decision making process.
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2.2.1

Procedural Rationality Dimension
Procedural rationality is defined as the extent to which the decision

process involves the collection of information relevant to the decision, and the
reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice (Dean &
Sharfman, 1993b). Managers who conduct and rely upon analysis in making their
choices – those who use more rational strategic processes – will be more likely to
develop effective plans for reconciling their organizations with environmental
reality. As Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988, 827) put it, rational processes allow
people to “form theories regarding which strategies will succeed.” Top managers
who fail to systematically collect and analyze information about environmental
trends and constraints will be much more likely to lead their organizations in
nonviable strategic directions (Dean & Sharfman, 1996).
2.2.2

Political Dimension
Political behavior has long been recognized as an aspect of organizational

decision making (Allison, 1971; Pettigrew, 1973). Since strategic decisions are
made among people by people for people, they are a welter of action, interaction,
and counteraction (Hickson, et al., 1986). An organization comprises distinct
groups of people with different motivations for getting involved in decisions
(Butler, 2002). The interplay of interests, conflict and power between individuals
and groups means that the strategic decision making process can be characterized
as political in nature (Wilson, 2003).
Two key ideas underlie the political dimension of decision making. First,
people in organizations have differences in interests resulting from functional,
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hierarchical, professional, and personal factors (Hickson, et al., 1986; Pettigrew,
1973). Second, people in organizations try to influence the outcomes of decisions
so that their own interests will be served, and they do so by using a variety of
political techniques (Pfeffer 1981; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). Hickson, et al.,
(1986) identify three main variables of political behavior or what they called
‘politicality’: 1) Intervention or the extent of external influence, 2) Imbalance or
the degree of uneven influence and 3) Contention of objectives or the extent of
disagreement over objectives. Disagreement over objectives tends to reduce
support for what has to be done later in implementation and diverts attention from
exploiting knowledge about how to do it. Disagreement also contributes to
unfavorable conditions (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Sharfman & Dean, 1997; Nutt,
1998; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1989). The personality and style of the decision
makers are important factors in the strategic decision making process. Some
people have preference for data while others prefer to go with their gut; some are
controlling, demanding and hoard information while others are inclusive, rely on
and involve others. Conflict among the varying personalities and styles should be
productively managed else conflict can be the detriment of the organization and
the decision (Nickols, 2005).
At first, Hickson, et al. (1986) argued that effective decisions must be
based on organizational goals. However, Dean and Sharfman (1996) later
assessed that political decision processes are typically not oriented toward
organizational goals, are unlikely to produce complete and accurate information,
and do not focus on environmental constraints. Consequently, they concluded
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that a link between politics and unsuccessful decisions was evident. Two years
later, Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers (1998) conducted research that found with
properly aligned tools, politics can have a positive influence on strategic decision
making. They (1998) found that formal planning systems appear to have a
positive influence on three aspects of the strategic decision making process:
comprehensiveness or rationality, lateral communication, and politicization (i.e.,
politics). Results indicate that formal planning influences the way in which
strategic decisions are taken and thus, to an extent, strategy itself. Indeed, by
influencing comprehensiveness, lateral communication, and political activities, a
formal planning system seems to act as a powerful input to the process of strategy
making (Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998). This is in line with theoretical
and normative speculations arguing that planning systems lead to more rational
decision making (Armstrong, 1982; Langley, 1988; Papadakis, Lioukas, &
Chambers, 1998), and results corroborate the prevailing view that formal planning
systems encourage both lateral communication and political behavior (Langley,
1988; Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998).
2.2.3

Complexity Dimension
An additional dimension of strategic decision processes not yet mentioned

is complexity. Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers (1998) determined this
dimensional factor associated more with the comprehensive or rationality aspect
in their study than with lateral communication and politics. Astley, et al., (1982)
argue that decision making may vary in terms of complexity and cleavage.
Complexity refers to the extent to which the topic (or decision to be made) is
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intricate and may involve multiple considerations such as ambiguity, uncertainty,
etc. and is likely to be greater in the case of innovative decisions. Cleavage, on
the other hand (or politicality as it is labelled by Hickson, et al., 1986) involves
the political dimension in decision making, for irrespective of complexity each
topic is subject to the diverse (and often conflicting) view of various interests.
Hickson, et al., (1986) also agree decision making may vary in terms of
complexity. They suggest that decision complexity is defined by the extent to
which the decision is unusual, the consequences that may stem from the decision,
the extent to which it will set precedents for later decisions and the degree to
which various interests and personnel become involved, both within and outside
the organization (Hickson, et al., 1986; Rowe, 1989).
2.2.4

Strategic Planning Tools
Strategic planning models are designed to help organizations cope with

rapid change to enhance an organization’s long-term prospects. Strategic
planning anticipates new trends to which the organization must adapt (Jarboe,
1996). Strategic planning models incorporate many of the elements of rational and
creative models where rational models include data gathering, problem definition,
solution generation, and solution evaluation and where creative models include
components of classic, rational problem solving plus a social aspect with attention
to arousing interest, motivation, belief in, and effort for the task (Jarboe, 1996).
Strategic planning tools also place emphasis on assessment of the external and
internal environments, increasing organizational learning, communication
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between groups, and processes tailored to the organization as well as the situation
at hand (Jarboe, 1996).
2.2.5

Section Summation
A summation of the three dimensions of the strategic decision making

process is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Each dimension has positive and negative
attributes; however, through applying strategic planning tools, viable strategic
decisions can be adequately determined. Strategic planning tools can be the
structure for who is participating and how, the process planning for data
collection and analysis, the proactive, bidirectional communication of participants
within organization, and/or the use of problem solving tools such as conceptual
maps, creative decision analysis tools and techniques based on the complexity and
severity of the problem (Mador, 2000). The development and application of
formal planning tools provide positive influence on comprehensiveness,
communication, and cleavage aspects of viable strategic decisions within the
decision making process.
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) say the strategic decision making process
is best described as an ‘interweaving’ of both bounded rationality and political
processes. More recent research emphasizes how executives make decisions
using political processes in addition to rational procedures (Butler, 2002).
Political behavior may shape the assumptions that feed into rational analysis, but
rationality appears to be a superior dimension of strategic decision making
because it alone, systematically and synthetically, leads to viable strategic choices
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and an overall effective decision making process (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is
reflected in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Decision Making

2.3

Decision Models
Strategic decision making is complex involving many conflicting interests

and environmental agents, taking long periods of time to make, and plagued by
numerous interruptions, delays, disruptions, etc. Despite the complexity and
seemingly random variations that characterize the strategic decision making
process, there is evidence to suggest the process follows certain standard patterns
15

(Shrivastava, 1983). Shrivastava (1983) described these patterns by the following
four strategic decision making models:
 Managerial Autocracy Model
 Systemic Bureaucracy Model
 Adaptive Planning Model
 Political Expediency Model
Shrivastava’s four models are described in terms of the six characteristics of
decision making as defined by research studies of Shrivastava and Grant in 1982.
The six characteristics are 1) problem familiarization and solution development,
2) number and level of people involved, 3) motivation, 4) types of analysis, 5)
role of organizational systems, and 6) environmental influences. These six
characteristics are illustrated pictorially in Figure 2.2 and further expanded in
Figure 2.3 (Shrivastava & Grant, 1982; Shrivastava, 1983).

Figure 2.2 Decision Making Characteristics
2.3.1

Managerial Autocracy Model
The first model is the Managerial Autocracy Model (MAM). Within the

MAM, there is a single manager who is the key decision maker. A large amount
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of power and authority rests with this single key manager who makes all strategic
decisions himself with technical assistance from several subordinates. Decision
making processes and outcomes are biased by the style and preferences of the
decision maker in charge and not by system tools, procedures, or accumulated
learning and experience of the organization (Shrivastava, 1983).
2.3.2

Systemic Bureaucracy Model
The second model is the Systemic Bureaucracy Model (SBM) where the

decision making process is oriented toward systems and procedures rather than
toward individuals and the individuals’ experience or expertise. Information
flows in an erratic and impersonal manner with decisions made by using wellestablished norm, rules, and regulations. Within the SBM model, well-defined
and documented stepwise procedures for handling all decisions are followed and
as long as procedures are followed the organization is happy, despite the decision
made (Shrivastava, 1983).
2.3.3

Adaptive Planning Model
The third model is the Adaptive Planning Model (APM). This model is a

practical version of systematic planning for viable strategic decision solutions
where plans are guidelines that are modified or deleted depending on the current
analysis of issues. Problem formulation occurs at the time of development of an
organizational plan that becomes the point of departure for strategic decision
making. Qualified experts systematically evaluate the technical merits of the
proposed alternatives in an effort to achieve efficient solutions to the problem
(Shrivastava, 1983).
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2.3.4

Political Expediency Model
The final model is the Political Expediency Model (PEM). This model

has several key decision makers or groups making decisions for personal gain,
protecting or advancing their own interests even at the cost of organizational
interests. While actual decision making is driven by interest group concerns,
problem formulation and solution development can follow organizationally
acceptable routines and procedures. Power is highly dispersed among
organizational managers, and despite process and procedures existing, managers
know how to circumvent the system to promote their own interests within the
PEM model (Shrivastava, 1983).
2.3.5

Section Summation
A summation of how the six decision making characteristics described in

2.3 correspond to each of the four decision models is listed in Figure 2.3
(Shrivastava & Grant, 1982; Shrivastava, 1983).
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Figure 2.3 Summary of Decision Making Models (Shrivastava, 1983)
Strategic decision making can vary among organizations; however,
understanding these models, that Shrivastava showed evidence of standard
patterns, can help decision makers redefine the process within the organization to
make the process more rational and efficient by identifying and reducing the
influences of undesirable, non-rational variables. For instance, one way to
improve decision making is to involve systematic participation by relevant
members who can handle technical complexity, risks, environmental constraints,
and effectively communicate information in which to achieve viable strategic
decisions and implementation plans that yield solutions to problems (Shrivastava,
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1983). Understanding the decision making models can help organizations
effectively execute the strategic decision making process and make successful,
viable strategic decisions.
2.4

Decision Determination

2.4.1

Tracing a Decision
Mintzberg and Waters (1990) quote a dissertation on decision making by

Nicoladies (1960, 173):
“It is evident on the basis of [my] analysis that an organizational
decision is in reality a constellation or a galaxy of numerous individual
decisions. Some of these decisions are “registered” in the book of the
organizational activities, while others remain hidden in the inner sanctum
of the human psyche. When and where a decision begins and ends is not
always clear.”
Decisions simply prove difficult to track down (Mintzberg & Waters,
1990). Defining the beginning and the end of a decision process is also difficult.
Does a decision begin when the group states a goal or problem, when it first
becomes aware of an issue, or when a single member recognizes a need? Does it
end when the choice is made, after the implementation period, or when the group
explicitly takes up another issue (Poole & Hirokawa, 1996)?
Do decisions precede actions? Can actions indeed trace back to the
decisions made? Mintzberg and Waters (1990) argue that action can occur
without commitment to act – as when a doctor strikes one’s knee – and challenge
readers to consider the following comment by an executive of one of the world’s
largest corporation in the 1990’s before thinking this is a far cry from the behavior
of formal organizations:
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“We use an iterative process to make a series of tentative decisions
on the way we think the market will go. As we get more data we modify
these continuously. It is often difficult to say who decided something and
when – or even who originated a decision…..I frequently don’t know
when a decision is made in General Motors. I don’t remember being in a
committee meeting when things came to a vote. Usually someone will
simply summarize a developing position. Everyone else either nods or
states his particular terms of consensus” (Quinn, 1980, 134).
Shift this into the more complex organizational setting where the
commitment must be collective, and the problem of identifying decision
magnifies enormously. Mintzberg and Waters (1990) say, given that an action
was taken, and that broad support preceded it, the when and where consensus
emerged must be found – for that must be the real ‘point’ of decision. In a
bureaucratic society, citizens are expected to decide formally and receive
approval before acting. However, not all organizations or all society are fully
bureaucratic (Mintzberg & Waters, 1990).
2.4.2. Strategy for Making a Decision
So how are decisions made? Is there a particular flow or recurring
strategy to decision making? Why are some decisions arrived at differently from
others? Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers (1998) discovered the following
strategic decision factors: perceived magnitude of impact, frequency, uncertainty,
threat/crisis component and whether a decision emerges through discipline of the
planning system of the firm, significantly influence the dimensions of the strategic
decision making process, more than other environmental, organizational and
managerial factors (Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998). Rowe (1989)
argues that every decision is unique and can move along alternate routes
depending upon the level of management involved and the stage at which they
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become involved. A number of studies extend the argument further, contending
that the role of ‘upper echelons’ or ‘top managers’ or ‘strategic leadership’ is
important enough to determine strategy content and process (Child, 1972;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Papadakis, Lioukas, &
Chambers, 1998). Studies from Astley, et al. (1982) and Hickson, et al. (1986)
became known as the Bradford Studies focusing on the ‘flow’ of management
decision making. As referenced earlier, Astley, et al. (1982) proposed a model
which argues that decision making may vary in terms of complexity and cleavage
(politics). They argue that particular combinations of problems and interests
throw up particular processes and identify three main processes – sporadic, fluid
and constricted – which can be linked with three types of subject matter – vortex,
tractable and familiar – to form three ‘ideal type’ modes of decision making:
vortex-sporadic, tractable-fluid and familiar-constricted (Hickson, et al., 1986;
Rowe, 1989).
Integrating research findings on decision strategies from Thompson and
Tuden (1964) and Thompson (1967) with Astley, et al. (1982) research, the
matrix in Figure 2.4 is formed (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). This matrix provides
insight for how decisions are determined.
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CELL 1

CELL 2

CELL 3

CELL 4

Figure 2.4 Decision Strategy Flow
2.4.2.1 Calculation Strategy
If complexity of the decision to be made is low and the political behavior
of group is low, then decision strategy is a simple computational (calculation)
procedure. This is depicted within cell 1 of Figure 2.4.
2.4.2.2 Inspiration Strategy
Vortex-sporadic decision making mode (i.e., cell 4) is high in both
complexity and politics. This mode sucks everyone into swirls of activity and is
likely to be protracted, running into disrupting delays and impediments.
Controversial and complex vortex matters tend to be processed in sporadic ways
(Miller, 2010). Decisions are likely to be taken to the highest level where only
inspiration by top management can provide an answer for what the decision will
be (Hickson, et al., 1986; Rowe, 1989). Thompson (1967) assesses that in cases
of high uncertainty management acts in an inspirational manner by making
obsolete any formal procedures and rules usually followed.
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2.4.2.3 Judgment Strategy
Tractable-fluid decision making mode (i.e., cell 3) is where less complex
and least political tractable matters tend to be process in fluid ways (Miller,
2010). If complexity surrounding a decision is high but exhibits low political
agendas by the group, then the decision strategy is judgment when the group can
collaborate as they scrutinize the details to reach understanding and an easily
negotiated decision. The decision is typically non-controversial. The tractablefluid decision making mode is more steadily paced that is formally channeled and
speedy (Hickson, et al., 1986; Rowe, 1989).
2.4.2.4 Compromise Strategy
Familiar-constricted decision making mode (i.e., cell 2) is where familiar
matters which are the least complex and of mid-level politicality follow
constricted ways (Miller, 2010). If complexity is low and politics is high, then a
compromise strategy through high levels of negotiating may apply (Hickson, et
al., 1986; Rowe, 1989).
2.4.2.5 Decision Strategy Flow
The model in Figure 2.4 is an abstraction, and it is not suggested that all
decisions fit neatly into it, but rather, that decisions will approximate to the
different cells. The decision outcome is dependent on the complexity of the
problems and the politics of the interests and, to a lesser extent, the nature of the
organization (Hickson, et al., 1986, Rowe, 1989). Management will, presumably,
try to present as many decisions as possible as matters for calculation (i.e., cell 1
of Figure 2.4), but if this is contested by the workforce or other managers,
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allowing complexity and/or cleavage to increase, then decision strategies move to
cells 2 and 3, or even to cell 4. The tension in the decision making process
between cells 1 and 4 creates a major source of conflict within the organization
and provides the political dimension (Rowe, 1989).
2.4.3

Section Summation
The aim of management therefore, is presumably to maximize the number

of decisions where the outcome can (as far as possible) be accurately determined
(i.e., calculation procedure in cell 1) and reduce dependency on compromise,
judgment and, in particular, inspiration (Thompson & Tuden, 1964; Thompson,
1967; Astley, et al., 1982; Hickson, et al., 1986; Rowe, 1989). Management
decision making may still be the ‘science of muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959),
but formal planning tool development may disentangle the muddle. The great
appeal of the hybrid Thompson, Tuden and Astley matrix in Figure 2.4 is that it is
both simple and fertile and a useful starting point for decision making analysis
(Rowe, 1989).
2.5

Decision Effectiveness
Strategic decision effectiveness is defined as the extent to which a

decision achieves the objectives established by management at the time it is made.
Effectiveness as perceived by external constituencies may of course differ from
management’s perceptions (Friedlander & Pickle, 1968). Managers have the
capacity to influence organizational outcomes through strategic choice (Dean &
Sharfman, 1996). Assumptions: 1) Decision processes are related to strategic
choices, and 2) The relationship between strategic decision making processes and
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effectiveness is that choices relate to outcomes. These two assumptions are
plausible which suggests it is reasonable to expect strategic decision making
processes to influence strategic decision effectiveness (Dean & Sharfman, 1996).
2.5.1 Positive Influences
Does the success or effectiveness of strategic decisions depend on the
steps managers use to make them (Hitt & Tyler, 1991)? This question is
fundamental to organization theory, as strategic decision making is a key element
of management-centered conceptions of organizations (Astley & Van de Ven,
1983; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). The concept of ‘strategic choice’ captures the
extent to which the operating environment of the organization places limits
around what managers can decide and how much autonomy they have in making
those decisions (Child, 1972). Burgelman (1991, 252) argued that “an
atmosphere in which strategic ideas can be freely championed and fully contested
by anyone with relevant information….may be a key factor in…generating viable
organizational strategies.” Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 266) argued that, for a
decision to be successful, “Information about the environment and possible
consequences of alternative actions must be acquired and processed”. Therefore,
in order for a decision process to result in an effective choice, it must be 1)
oriented toward achieving appropriate organizational goals, 2) based on accurate
information linking various alternatives to these goals, and 3) based on an
appreciation and understanding of environmental constraints (Dean & Sharfman,
1996). Results of Paul Nutt’s study (2005) of 376 strategic, non-routine decisions
indicated that a rational, goal-oriented search approach tends to lead to more
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successful outcomes. Hough and White (2003) in a simulated environment found
a positive relationship between rationality and decision quality and that this
relationship was contingent upon environmental dynamism (i.e., uncertainty)
(Goll & Rasheed, 1997).
The quality of information available to a group is one of the most
important determinants of successful group decision making (Kelley & Thibaut,
1969). Nooraie (2008) found that rationality mediated the relationship between
decision magnitude of impact and decision quality. Groups are more likely to
reach high-quality decisions when their decision making processes are
characterized by careful and painstaking examination and reexamination of the
information on which the choice is to be based (Janis & Mann, 1977). Dean and
Sharfman (1996, 389) note that “managers who collected information and used
analytical techniques made decisions that were more effective than those who did
not. Those who engaged in the use of power or pushed hidden agendas were less
effective than those who did not.” They note that their study, despite using quite a
different methodology, shows “that some of the findings of Eisenhardt and
Bourgeois (1988) and Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988), extend beyond unstable
environments to include stable ones as well” (Dean & Sharfman 1996, 389;
Mador, 2000). Peter Senge (1990) observes groups are more likely to arrive at
high-quality decisions when they employ a rational, as opposed to a political,
logic in arriving at a final decision.
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2.5.2

Negative Influences
Crucial to successful decision making and problem solving in groups is

the extent to which members’ interaction ensures that particular requirements of
their tasks are being fulfilled. If they are not adequately addressed, the chances of
the group’s making a good decision or identifying an effective solution to a
problem are diminished (Gouran & Hirokawa, 1996). As Irving Janis (1989) so
aptly noted, however, decision making and problem solving are activities that
groups frequently perform under the influence of powerful social influences that
can and do interfere with the ability of participants to satisfy the essential
requirements of a decision making or problem solving task. Janis (1989)
identified three sources of negative influences that he called ‘constraints’:
cognitive, affiliative, and egocentric. When any of these three constraints become
dominant, the interests of effective decision making are apt to be ill served unless
action is taken.
Janis (1989) relates cognitive constraints to perceived deficiencies in the
resources (information, time, and skills necessary for performing the task)
available to group members. When present, they lead to superficiality in the
analysis of issues and alternatives a group may be considering. Affiliative
constraints contribute to preoccupations with relationships and the well-being of
the group (Janis, 1989). As a result, they can shift the focus of inquiry from
making the best choice to the accommodation of differences in points of view.
Janis (1989) also defined egocentric constraints as those deriving from the
personal needs of the members (typically needs concerned with control). Such

28

constraints are productive of conflict, the culmination of which is often
acquiescence rather than informed choice (Janis 1989; Gouran & Hirokawa,
1996). If manipulation of data and secret communication exist, it could lead to
selective and biased disclosure of relevant information (Pettigrew, 1973) and give
rise to disappointing outcomes (Dean & Sharfman, 1996).
2.5.3

Section Summation
Although it is clear that group decision making performance is affected by

a variety of factors and influences, there are many who suggest that the quality of
communication that occurs as a group attempts to reach a collective decision may
well be the single most important influence on the decision making success or
failure (Hackman & Morris, 1975; Janis & Mann, 1977; McGrath, 1984;
Hirokawa, Erbert, & Hurst, 1996). When a group communicates the right
information at the right time in the right way, then the communication and the
decision making will be more effective (Eikenberry, 2005). The existence of
communication is necessary to measure the effectiveness of any decision (Hitt,
Miller, & Colella, 2006).
2.6

Communication
Social systems theory considers communication as the basic element of

any organization (Luhmann, 2000). Habermas (1998) finds that activities
between people need a certain amount of communication, which must be fulfilled
in order to coordinate actions effectively for the purpose of satisfying needs. In
organizations the act of fulfilling these needs is an effective problem solving
process, in other words, effective decision-making (Habermas, 1998). Social
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systems theory observes decision making as communication that opens future
alternatives of action (Baraldi, 2013).
2.6.1

Communication is Vital
Communications is the instrument by which members of groups with

varying degrees of success reach decisions and generate solutions to problems
(Poole & Hirokawa, 1996). They found that communication constitutes decisions
in at least two senses: 1) through communication the form and content of
decisions are worked out, and 2) at a more fundamental level, decisions are social
products embedded in “social reality”. Communication processes are the primary
means through which social realities, as experienced by participants, are created
and sustained, and therefore are the prerequisites for making decision.
There are a variety of communication modes for decision making: face-toface communication, written communication, audio communication, and
electronically mediated audio/visual communication (Argyle & Cook, 1976;
Hirokawa, Erbert, & Hurst, 1996). Results of investigations have been mixed, but
the prevailing view is that less restrictive communicative modes tend to be
associated with high-quality decisions than more restrictive modes (e.g., audio
only) when more complex and difficult decision making tasks have been
employed (Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff, 1986; Hirokawa, Erbert, & Hurst, 1996). As
the difficulty of a decision task increases, systematic face-to-face interaction tends
to result in higher-quality outcomes (Hirokawa, 1988; Jarboe, 1988). Less
restrictive mode, like face-to-face communication, provides group members with
increased opportunity to exchange and utilize information in arriving at a solution
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to the problem (McGrath, 1984). A study by Harper and Askling (1980) found
that groups making high-quality decisions displayed higher-quality leadership,
more open communication, and a higher proportion of active participants than did
groups whose decision were judged to be of low quality.
2.6.2

Communication, Process and Decision Making Performance

Is group communication related to group decision making performance? Some
contend that communication actually produces group decisions by creating and
shaping the contexts with which those decisions are made and enacted (Hirokawa,
Erbert, & Hurst, 1996). Hackman (1990) contends that group decision making
performance is determined by three “enabling conditions”: sufficient group effort,
adequate knowledge and skills possessed by group members, and appropriate
performance strategies, processes, and procedures employed in reaching a
decision. Moreover, he suggests that these enabling conditions exert positive
influence on group performance through the mediation of communication and
interactions (Hackman, 1990). Habermas (1998) further surmises that social
action and communicative practices are inherent parts of decision making process
and performance.
Formal planning tools (i.e., planning models, procedures, building
participant involvement, and promoting communication networks within the
group) are social in intent with clear, task-related functions for the decision
making process (Jarboe, 1996). The assumption behind involving people is that
involvement increases the amount of information available to the group, increases
commitment to the decision, improves dissemination of that decision, and
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enhances commitment to group problem solving, thereby increasing the likelihood
of quality thought throughout the process (Jarboe,1996). Procedures can also
produce communicative behavior that produces outcomes (Jarboe, 1996).
Outcome measures in decision making are often associated with primary
task activity such as the quality of solutions, the number of ideas, or the
uniqueness of ideas. Although these [quality, number and uniqueness] are the
most practical ways to assess outcomes in laboratory research, there is little doubt
that the value of a decision depends on the confluence of subsequent events
(Reagan & Rohrbaugh, 1990). Reagan and Rohrbaugh (1990, 21) further offer
“any assessment of the effectiveness of decision making performance requires
directing primary attention to the process itself, not [just] to subsequent
outcomes.” They studied various approaches to group decision making and
discovered eight distinct criteria – adaptability, legitimacy, efficiency, goal
centeredness, accountability, data based, participatory and supportability – to
assess both process and decision effectiveness as communicated and conducted by
a group (Reagan & Rohrbaugh, 1990). The eight criteria are summarized in the
following questions by Reagan and Rohrbaugh (1990) as an evaluation of both
decision making process and outcome effectiveness:
 From a rational perspective, was the decision making process
conducted by the group goal-centered and the resulting decision
efficient?
 From a political perspective, was the decision making process
adaptable for the group and the resulting decision legitimate?
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 From a consensual perspective, was the decision making process
participatory by the group and the resulting decision supportable?
 From an empirical perspective, was the decision making process
data-based and the resulting decision accountable?
2.6.3 Communicating Decisions
A decision is the commitment to a particular course of action (Mintzberg,
et al., 1976), and the decision must be communicated clearly, coherently and
convincingly (Nickols, 2005). One of the areas where the gap in decision making
is widest is in communicating decisions. Decisions are made, but the
communication of those decisions has shown to be ineffective or incomplete
(Eikenberry, 2005). The following guidelines (Eikenberry, 2005; Busch 2012)
help to successfully communicate decisions within an organization (and beyond):
 Determine who (i.e., one executive, individual managers or both)
and when (i.e., sooner the better) the decision is communicated
and how (i.e., email, team meeting, voicemail, newsletter, etc.)
 Clearly, correctly, and concisely communicate exactly what was
decided and the rationale that led to the decision
 Clearly stipulate how the decision’s effectiveness will be
measured (i.e., communicating the measures for success is
especially important to those who may disagree with the decision),
and
 Understand communication is a two way process (i.e., a complete
communication plan of transmission of message, receipt of
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message and feedback on message ensures individuals have
received and understood the decision
The results of a communication study by Habermas in 1998 show that
both managers and employees found the best ways to communicate decisions
were in meetings, email, or face-to-face conversation. Usually the channel [of
communication] was chosen by the urgency of the message (Mykkanen, 2010);
however, the important aspect is that the decision is communicated.
2.6.4 Section Summation
Substantial research has proven a direct link between communication,
decision making performance through process, and decision making effectiveness.
High quality decisions require communication for the adequate understanding of
the problem, the formulation of viable strategic solutions to the problem and the
effective implementation of those solutions to the problem. However, research in
the processes of decision making and the communication of those decisions
within the process is fairly new (Mykkanen, 2010). The outcomes of more
research in this realm could further benefit practical applications of decision
making and communicating decision within organizations, help organizations to
evaluate whether the decision making process is too lengthy and whether the
outcomes of the process reach the desired recipients, and help organizations
concentrate on using more coherent information in decision making to improve
organizational performance (Mykkanen, 2010).
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2.7

Literature Review Conclusions
A resounding theme within the research literature is that strategic

decisions are not routine, not well-structured, and not easily made due to a high
degree of uncertainty associated with the problems to be solved, thus, rationality
is necessary to achieve viable strategic decisions. Rationality is one of three
dimensions associated with the strategic decision making process. Politics and
complexity are also dimensions as presented previously in Figure 2.1 within
section 2.2.5. Depending on the dimension evident, Figure 2.1 illustrates a path
as guidance for how teams can reach viable strategic decisions. Of the three
dimensions, the application of procedural rationality fosters team consensus and
produces effective and better quality decisions; however, this method can be timeconsuming. Research shows that the optimal decision making process includes
open and continual communication among all decision makers in repetitive
evaluations of collected data to determine strategic decisions that are rationally
assessed against environmental trends and threats. As the perceived impact or
implied consequences of the decisions to be made escalates, so does the need for
decision makers to act rationally. Since people are involved, complexity and
political influences are seldom absent from problem solving and decision making.
To offset conflicts arising from the complexity and uncertainty amongst varying
personalities and interests of the decision makers and amongst the varying details,
risks, and consequences stemming from the problems to be solved, a team can
apply formal assessment techniques such as procedures, devil’s advocacy, and
dialectical inquiry that critique ideas or alternatives to drive out the best decisions.
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Planning tools increase learning and communication within the team, enhance
assessment of environmental constraints, allow processes to be tailored to specific
organizational needs, and employ appropriate performance strategies to reach
viable strategic decisions. Team interaction and open communication are vital to
effective decision making where team involvement in making decisions increases
not only the commitment to and quality of the resulting decisions, but also
improves dissemination and execution of those resulting strategic decisions.
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CHAPTER III

PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STATEMENT

3.1

Problem Definition
The most important task in any systems decision process is to identify and

understand the problem which is informed by understanding the concerns,
objectives and constraints of the stakeholders (Parnell, et al., 2011). Figure 3.1
below shows the three components that help define the problem space for this
study. They are 1) identifying the problem, 2) understanding the stakeholders
who are the individuals possessing a vested interest in the problem, and 3)
determining the best research approach to tackle the identified problem. Each
component will be further discussed in the following sections.

Figure 3.1 Definition of Problem Space (Parnell, et al., 2011)
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3.1.1

Problem Identification
At a high level, this study aimed at understanding the communication and

decision making process as part of the Systems Engineering practice at the
NASA/Marshall Center. The SLS Program, managed by the Marshall Center,
served as the test bed for analysis. To that end, three SLS Change Requests (CRs)
flowing through the Configuration Management change control process provided
the specific basis for the research and analysis.
The focus of this study was to understand the decision making process by
tracking the three SLS CRs from initiation to official approval. To drive down to
the crux of the problem for a thorough investigation and solution
recommendation, the ‘5-Whys’ technique (Goodwin and Wright, 2012) was
applied.
1. Why understand the SLS the decision making process?
 To understand how each CR was introduced, discussed, approved, and
communicated within the decision making process
2. Why understand how each CR was introduced, discussed, approved, and
communicated within the decision making process?
 To understand key drivers leading to the decisions
3. Why understand the key drivers leading to the decisions?
 To better understand if, how, and why the key drivers differed
amongst the three CRs
4. Why understand if, how, and why the key drivers differed?
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 Because the initial findings reflected that while all CRs were classified
as Category 1 and successfully approved, each completed the process
differently
5. While each CR was successfully approved, why did each CR complete the
process differently?
 Not sure. Thus, this was the identified root problem around which the
research and analysis was focused to better understanding the SLS
communication and decision making process.
3.1.2

Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholders play an important role in the decision process for any project.

When approaching a decision, stakeholders typically have their own schemata and
filtering criteria in which to apply solutions that meet their intermediate needs.
Schemata (or mental models) are cognitive structures that represent one’s general
knowledge about a given concept or stimulus domain, including its attributes and
the relations among those attributes (Oliver & Roos, 2005). Both the mental
models and criterion are dependent on their disciplined area of expertise.
With this study, the stakeholders were no different. Each stakeholder had
a vested interest, be it power, legitimacy, or an urgency, to influence, not only the
decision making process, but also the review and processing direction for each
CR studied. This section will identify the stakeholders and the level of influence
each contributed to the study.
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3.1.2.1 Stakeholder Identification
For this study, the individuals who could provide insight into the technical
discussion patterns, approval processes, resulting decisions, factors influencing
the resulting decisions, communication of the resulting decisions, and
effectiveness of resulting decisions (i.e., implementation success) for the SLS CR
processing were identified as stakeholders and reflected here.
1. Exploration Systems Development’s (ESD) Cross Programs
o Orion / Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program
o Space Launch System (SLS) Program
o Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program
2. SLS Program Office
o SLS Program Managers
o Stages Element Managers
o Boosters Element Managers
o Engines Element Managers
o Spacecraft & Payload Integration Element Managers
o Advanced Development Element Managers
3. SLS Chief Engineers Office
4. SLS Lead Systems Engineering Team
5. SLS Discipline Lead Engineers
6. SLS Element Discipline Lead Engineers
7. Change Request Change Package Engineer
8. SLS Configuration Management Office
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o Configuration Management Manager
o Configuration Management Release Desk
3.1.2.2 Stakeholder Salience Definitions
To complete a stakeholder analysis for this study, the following definitions
were employed:


Power – Made the final decision and responsible for overall budget and
schedule resources



Legitimacy – Had direct relationship to decision to be made



Urgency – Had a critical need to find solution and/or critical claim to decision
to be made

Figure 3.2 Stakeholder Salience Types (Parnell, et al., 2011)
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Of the eight attributes classified for stakeholder saliency of influence
(Matty, 2010) reflected above, there were three specific types fulfilled by the
stakeholders within this study. Each of the three specific stakeholder type will be
discussed in the following sections.
3.1.2.3 Definitive Stakeholders
The Exploration Systems Development (ESD) division is responsible for
ensuring technical, cost, and schedule details across three Programs align with
agency, presidential, and legislative goals. The three Programs are reflected here
in Figure 3.3.

Exploration Systems Development’s Cross Programs
Orion/MPCV
Program

GSDO
Program

SLS Program

Stages

Boosters

Engines

Spacecraft &
Payload
Integration

Advanced
Development

Figure 3.3 SLS Program Definitive Stakeholders
The Orion/MPCV Program, managed by Johnson Space Center (JSC),
develops the crew exploration vehicle that will carry the crew to space, provide
emergency abort capability, sustain the crew during space travel, and provide safe
re-entry. The SLS Program, managed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC),
develops the heavy lift vehicle that will launch the crew vehicle, and eventually
other modules and cargo for specified missions. The GSDO Program, managed by
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Kennedy Space Center (KSC), provides the ground systems, infrastructure, and
services to perform ground processing, launch and recovery, as applicable, for the
SLS and MPCV Programs. The Cross Programs, collectively, comprise a
definitive stakeholder exhibiting power, legitimacy and urgency.
The SLS Program is a multi-element program which includes a Stages
Element, Boosters Element, an Engines Element, a Spacecraft and Payload
Integration Element and an Advanced Development Element as illustrated above
in Figure 3.3. The SLS Program Manager leads the management, integration, and
direction of all the SLS Element activities ensuring compliance and consistency
with NASA Agency policy and priorities. All of the SLS Element Managers
report to the SLS Program Manager regarding safety, schedule, performance, and
cost details in the design and development of hardware and related systems of
their respective Elements. The SLS Program Manger chairs the SLS Program
Control Board (PCB) and is the decision authority for all SLS baseline changes.
Consequently, The SLS Program Manager is a definitive stakeholder exhibiting
power, legitimacy and urgency attributes. Specifically to the Change Request
(CR) processing, the SLS Program Manager and SLS Element Managers depend
on thorough reviews by subordinates/engineering discipline experts with
concurrences and/or concerns with recommendations and forward plans presented
at the PCB.
With respect to this study, both the Cross Programs and SLS Program
Manager were highly salient, major stakeholders with direct access to budgetary
and other programmatic resources. They were powerful and legitimate
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stakeholders who considered all technical recommendations, suggestions and
options in relation to schedule and budget constraints to ultimately make the final
decisions.
3.1.2.4 Dependent Stakeholders
The majority of the stakeholders discussed in this section are specific
engineering entities within the SLS Program itself and illustrated in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 SLS Program Dependent Stakeholders
First, the SLS Chief Engineer (CE) executes Systems Engineering and
Integration (SE&I) at the SLS Program level. The CE is responsible for the
integrated SLS vehicle design and has a team of Chief Engineers distributed
across the Elements. These Element Chief Engineers (ECEs) ensure the technical
work at the Element levels meets the requirements of the integrated vehicle
design. The CE chairs the Chief Engineer Control Board (CECB) which serves as
the engineering authority for SLS Program baselines. The CECB also functions
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as a technical pre-Board to the PCB where it reviews all changes within its
defined authority and makes recommendations on any engineering and safety
content seeking PCB final approval.
Next is the Lead Systems Engineer (LSE) who also has a team of System
Engineers distributed across the Elements. The LSE and the Element Lead
Systems Engineers (ELSEs) ensure the planning and production of all multidiscipline deliverables for the SLS vehicle. The LSE also leads the change
management effort within engineering for the SLS Program.
The Discipline Lead Engineers (DLEs) are the single authoritative entity
for understanding, assessment, and recommendations related to their assigned
discipline for the entire vehicle. The DLEs are members of the CECB and are
responsible for ensuring all integration with other disciplines and the Elements is
achieved prior to seeking CE approval. DLEs are responsible for carrying any
dissenting opinions to the CECB.
The Element Discipline Lead Engineers (EDLEs) are technically
accountable to the ECEs regarding data provided by the Elements for use at the
vehicle level meets the needs of the vehicle and is technically adequate with
respect to their discipline scope.
The SLS CE, ECEs, LSE, ELSEs, DLEs and EDLEs were all dependent
stakeholders. This group of moderately salient stakeholders had a direct
relationship to the decisions under review. Overall, they had a critical need to
seek solutions or had decisions made with respect to issues applicable to their
areas of technical/discipline expertise. The engineers had some power in
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providing technical suggestions and/or recommendations for consideration at a
Control Board but do not make the final decision.
Lastly of the dependent stakeholders is the CR Change Package Engineer
(CPE); however, the CR CPE is not reflected on in Figure 3.3 because the CR
CPE is an appointed position dependent on the technical expertise pertinent to a
given proposed change. The CR CPE is responsible for the review and
consolidation of comments from mandatory evaluators and the recommendation
of a change disposition to the CECB and PCB. The CR CPE has a vested interest
in the review of a CR and therefore categorized as a dependent stakeholder. As
the CR shepherd, this moderately salient stakeholder has both a critical need and
sense of urgency to obtain a thorough review, consensus, and a formal decision to
the proposed technical change.
While these dependent stakeholders (i.e., CR CPE, SLS CE, SLS LSE and
the collage of expert engineers) did not make the final decisions, they were,
however, the more deeply involved stakeholders in the CR initiation, review,
approval, and implementation process. Furthermore, these dependent
stakeholders were also the more influential stakeholders in technical assessments
and decision package recommendations typically presented to the SLS Program
Manager for final approval at the PCB.
3.1.2.5 Discretionary Stakeholders
The SLS Receipt and Release Desk (R&RD) and Change Package
Manager (CPM) are entities within the SLS Configuration Management (CM)
Office. The SLS R&RD is the authoritative point for all communication related
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to official CM products and serves as the official location for submittal of CRs.
The CPM assists the CR CPE with the CR life-cycle process, from CR initiation
to closure of the Control Board directive actions.
From the study, the CM Office was a discretionary stakeholder. This
latent salient stakeholder had no power or critical need for a decision to be made
on the CRs; however, the CM Office did exhibit legitimacy by ensuring the
official release of CRs for review and support with the CR processing, if/as
needed.
Figure 3.5 summarizes the saliency types of all the stakeholders associated
with the decision making study.

Figure 3.5 Stakeholder Analysis for the SLS Decision Making Study
3.1.3

Research Approach
For this study, a teaming approach was invoked to ensure the root problem

was thoroughly researched, assessed, understood, and solved. The team was
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comprised of the thesis author and the SLS team members (i.e., stakeholders) who
were personally involved in the reviews and decision making process for the three
CRs. A survey was determined the better mechanism for data collection and
analysis and thus employed. In addition to the survey, research and a better
understanding of the formal SLS CM change control process was necessary to
understand how and where the CR processing could have differed from the
documented process. This entailed understanding the former CM change control
process that included Tabletop reviews and the updated CM process that replaced
Tabletop reviews with the Task Team review approach.
To focus the research, any ‘known’, ‘partially known’ and ‘unknown’
details were determined. The ‘known’ details (or details with documented results)
were:


The Marshall Center had governing /guidance procedures/policies (NASA
Procedural Requirements (NPRs), Marshall Procedural Requirements (MPRs),
Handbooks, etc.) for program/project management and execution, safety and
mission assurance, systems engineering, and technical design and standards.



The SLS Program had a formal Configuration Management (CM) Plan that
defined CM requirements, process and procedures for the control of SLS
technical and programmatic documentation.



A CR, affecting a SLS baseline, followed the CM change control process for
disposition and approval at the SLS PCB.



All three CRs were classified as Category 1 which meant the CRs referenced
the SLS Program baseline and required a rigorous control via an established
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and standardized CM process utilizing configuration control boards such the
SLS PCB for official approval, control board directive actions, and
concurrence sheets (SLS CM Plan, 2013).


All three CRs were successfully approved and implemented.
o CR53


Originated: July 2012



Approved: October 2012

o CR70


Originated: October 2012



Put Back: January 2013



Re-Released: February 2013



Approved: April 2013

o CR82





Originated: October 2012



Approved: December 2012

All three CRs were processed and approved via different paths.
o CR53


No Tabletop reviews held



No Form 4511 signed



Approving Board: PCB

o CR70


Series of Tabletop reviews held



Processed through CECB and put-back at PCB
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CM process updated



Task Team review held



CR re-released



Approving Board: PCB

o CR82





No Tabletop reviews



Form 4511 signed by LSE only



Approving Board: Joint PCB with JSC

With all three CRs, discipline representatives were involved in the review
process along with CM representatives. So technical expertise was available
to aid CR technical processing, and CM expertise was available to aid CR
change control processing.

The ‘partially known’ details (or details with partial data available) were:


With the time difference equaling six months to a year between CR review
and survey input, the survey data provided by the stakeholders was at best
memory recall with exact details not remembered very well. The survey
respondents did their best to recall data and provide the best answer they
could recall from memory.

The ‘unknown’ details (or details certain to have no data or knowledge of) were:


The specific survey respondents’ names were unknown, and the linkages
between the specific respondents and their survey inputs were unknown.
Consequently, clarifying information could not be obtained after the survey
responses were submitted.

50

3.1.3.1 Problem Statement
The desired outcome of this study was to better understand the decision
making and communication process within the SE practices at the Marshall
Center and have an understanding of the level of its effectiveness. On the surface,
there appeared from the root problem identified earlier (in 3.1.1) to exist some
potential inefficiencies. To accomplish the desired outcome, a teaming approach
of the thesis author and participating SLS members through anonymous survey
inputs collaborated using the SLS CR change control process as a surrogate to
determine whether resource and communication efficiencies existed that would
make the exercised decision making process more effective. A lesson learned
from the Constellation reflected a less than stellar and ineffective strategic
decision making process existed for the program. With respect to decision
making and communication, this study investigated whether the SLS Program
management had learned from Constellation and was sufficiently implementing
recommendations from the abruptly cancelled program.
3.1.3.2 Focused Research Questions
To accomplish the objectives of the problem statement, the following
research questions served as the specific investigation focus:


How did the process differ for each CR?



Why did the process differ?



What were the key drivers for the differences in CR processing?



What were the benefits and/or drawbacks with the differences in the CR
processing?

51



Were the same resources expended for each CR or efficiently minimized?



Did those involved in the CR processing feel their contribution was value
added to the decision making and approval of the technical change?



What strongly influenced the decisions?



How were technical reviews, technical recommendations, resulting decisions
and action plans communicated? Were they well-defined, well-structured,
well-vetted and/or well-communicated?
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CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

A five step approach was formulated in developing the methodology to
address the research questions for this study. The five steps were 1) determine the
strategic decision and communication specific characteristics of the CRs under
investigation, 2) develop an instrument that will capture the necessary information
to better understand the decision and communication specific characteristics, 3)
identify sample population for data collection, 4) administer data collection
instrument, and 5) analyze collected data.
4.1

CR Decision and Communication Characteristics
Based on the literature review, the following list of characteristics were

consistent with the strategic decision making and communication processes. As
the first step of the study’s methodology, this list was evaluated for commonality
with the three SLS CR decisions.


Comprehensive with significant impact as a whole and on long-term
performance



Time intensive



Significant commitment of resources



Shared effort - not an isolated, unitary event
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Complex social and communicative process



Uncertainty



Dynamically evolvable



Solutions based on bounded rationality, insight, perceived magnitude of
impact and inspiration



Adaptable to opportunities, threats, constraints and environmental factors



Influenced by politics



Precedent setting



Create waves of lesser decisions



Non-routine and unusual
Table 4.1 reflects the decisions for each of the three SLS CRs as well as

the decision process flow for each CR.
Table 4.1 SLS CR Decisions
CR

CR53

SLSL CR DECISION

Implement Flight Termination System (FTS)
architecture option 10A into the SLS vehicle baseline

Update the Data Requirements List (DRL) with the
latest Data Requirement Description (DRD) changes
CR70 needed to reflect the baseline version. The update is
required to support SLS Preliminary Design Review
(PDR) planning.

CR82

Implement Core Stage Forward Skirt umbilical with the
independent Vehicle Stabilization System (VSS)

RESOURCES

STAKEHOLDERS

PROCESS FLOW

DURATION

Cost
Schedule
Mass

PM, CE, LSE, CSO,
Stages, Booster &
Payload Element
Management, all DLEs
all EDLEs, and
GSDO & MPCV
Programs

Routine technical CR released
per CE direction, no Table Top
review, no signed Form 4511,
CECB approval, and then PCB
approval

3 months

Cost
Schedule
Manpower

Routine programmatic CR
released, 5 Table Top reviews,
CECB approval, PCB puts
PM, CE, LSE, CSO,
back the CR due to cost
all Elements, all DLEs,
impacts, CM process
all EDLEs, and
updated, Task Team reviews
GSDO Program
& signs Form 4511, CR rereleased, CECB approval &
then PCB approval

6 months

Cost
Schedule
Mass

PM, CE, LSE, CSO,
Core Element,
Structure &
Environments DLE,
Test DLE, and
GSDO Program

Urgent technical CR released,
no Table top review, Form
4511 signed by LSE only, no
CECB or PCB, approved @
JPCB

These CR decisions appear to be strategic, aligning with several of the
characteristics listed above. Significant resources such as cost, schedule,
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2 months

manpower, and vehicle mass were substantial evaluation factors. While the SLS
PM was the final decision authority, the PM could not complete the engineering
assessment alone. Oftentimes, the engineering change was complex requiring
collaboration and technical expertise from many stakeholders. Table 4.1
illustrated the breadth of technical expertise that was necessary for a
comprehensive assessment of not only the feasibility of the technical change, but
also of the impacts the change had on resources, vehicle design, mission success,
safety, etc. This assessment plus the analysis of how to mitigate and/or manage
risks appeared to be time consuming especially when the change entailed much
uncertainty or ambiguity. While a shared and highly communicative effort among
the organizational teams determined decisions that were weighed against threats,
constraints, and environmental factors, it undoubtedly also evoked political
influences with potential negative contributions to the decision making process.
To offset this, the team applied assessment techniques such as devil’s advocacy
and dialectical inquiry that critiqued ideas or alternatives to drive out the best
decisions.
4.2

Research Method Development
Step two was to develop an instrument to capture the necessary

information to better understand the strategic decision and communication
characteristics. This entailed determining the best research method to collect the
data and developing the mechanism to be thorough, succinct, and user-friendly.
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4.2.1

Research Method Selection
One method considered to obtain information was through face-to-face,

one-on-one interviews. However, with hectic schedules filled with detailed
technical design work on the SLS launch vehicle and individual Element (i.e.,
Boosters, Stages, Spacecraft/Payload, Engines) design reviews and deadlines
looming, interviews were not a viable option. Consequently, the better approach
to gathering data was a web-based survey. This type of survey afforded an
anonymous, user-friendly environment for easy access and easy submittal for the
participants. The research need, goals, and planned data collection method were
presented to the SLS CE office and approved to proceed.
4.2.2

Survey Instrument Development
A software package called SurveyGizmo was first researched and found

adequate for survey development, administration, data collection, and data
analysis. SurveyGizmo also met the anonymous and user-friendly environment
criteria. The goal was for a survey to be quick and easy for the respondents to
complete, but also direct enough to evoke respondents to provide information of
their perceived notions and understanding of the communication flow and
decision making practices specifically for SLS engineering change request
processing.
The survey was designed to be succinct for respondents to give quick
answers. Comment sections were also available allowing respondents to be as
verbose as desired to provide any information they wanted.
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Construction of the specific survey questions were based on the existing
philosophy of the SLS CR change control process. Three primary areas of
exploration (i.e., process, problem identification, and success) were defined
within the survey. The breakdown of the different types of questions per area are
listed in the next sections.
4.2.2.1 Process Oriented Questions
These survey questions were focused on the mechanics of the SLS CR
change control processing. In theory, the CR was generated by an entity (i.e.,
person or group) that requested a technical or programmatic change and then
shepherded the CR through a series of events (i.e., official release of CR, formal
review period for comments to the CR, discussions of comment dispositions
and/or potential impacts, and notification of CR approval). The intent of the
survey questions was to gain insight into the respondents’ knowledge of the CR
change process and to determine if the process was effectively practiced.
•

Who (person or group) generated the CR?

•

How were you notified of the CR for assessment?

•

Were you involved in the discussion of any impacts stemming from the
dis-positioned comments from the review of the CR? Explain.

•

How were you notified of the Table Top or Task Team Review for this
CR?

•

When did the decision / approval of the CR officially get to you
(approximate month and year) or Never?
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4.2.2.2 Problem Identification Questions
The problem identification questions focused on identifying gaps or issues
(underlying or blatant) which the respondents personally experienced or
witnessed during the CR decision formulation. The intent was to not only
pinpoint and understand the problem, but also to assess for potential
recommendation for improvement or efficiency to SLS Program management
and/or SE&I technical authority.
•

What was your motivation in reviewing the CR?

•

Would the assessment have benefited from additional expertise or input?
If yes, what expertise would have improved the CR assessment?

•

Do you feel you had adequate time and/or CR related materials to perform
an assessment of this CR? If no, what hindered your review?

•

Do you think your comments were assessed adequately in the Table Top
or Task Team Review process? Explain.

•

If you did not fully understand the CR decision and its implementation
plan, what would have aided your understanding?

•

Were there any gaps in communication during the CR review? If yes,
what were they?

•

Were there cost or schedule impacts due to communication glitches during
the CR review? If yes, what were they?

4.2.2.3 Success Oriented Questions
The success oriented questions focused on identifying successes and/or
positive tenets of the decision making and communication process the

58

respondents experienced or witnessed. It was important that the active
participants in the CR process shared technical expertise for strategic decision
making. They also needed to feel their concerns were heard and that they were
viewed as a knowledgeable contributing member of the team. The intent of these
questions was to determine the respondents’ level of involvement in decision
making, determine the level of awareness and agreement with the resulting
decision, and to understand the respondents’ perspective of the decision making
process effectiveness.
•

Do you believe you provided a needed contribution to the CR assessment?

•

How do you feel your comments were received and dis-positioned?

•

Do you think your comments were assessed adequately in the Table Top
or Task Team Review process? Explain.

•

Did you fully understand the CR decision and its implementation plan?

•

To what degree did you agree with the CR decision?

•

From your perspective, were your concerns with the CR dealt with
effectively?

•

From your perspective, how would you describe the decision process with
respect to the CR?

Each of the three CR surveys contained these same types of questions with the
header of the survey serving as the distinguishing factor between them. The
survey content was vetted through SLS and approved.
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4.3

Sample Population Identification
Step three was to identify the population of individuals most involved with

each CR’s decision making and communication process. The technical scope,
urgency, resources, and population varied for each CR. Participant data were
collected from two primary sources: 1) the original email notification of the CR
issuance from the SLS CM Release Desk, and 2) the consolidated matrices of
reviewer comments for each CR. The official notification of a CR’s release came
in the form of an email from the SLS CM office with a pre-coordinated, preapproved distribution list of multi-layer managers (LSE, CSO, ECEs, and DLEs).
These managers participated in the CR change control process, and they could
notify members of their teams either verbally or by the forwarded SLS CM email,
requesting their participation in the CR review also. Any one that provided
comments to the CR CPE were captured in a consolidated matrix for formal
review and disposition. Therefore, these two primary sources were selected for a
comprehensive list of participants for each CR. The list of names compiled for
each CR was vetted through SLS technical authority management and approved.
This list of names served as the population for each CR and ranged from 13
individuals to 118.
4.4

Survey Administration
With an approved research request, survey, and population from the SLS

Program, the next step was to administer the surveys. Official notification of the
survey originated as an email from the SLS CE Office and included the secured
participant distribution list and a link to the web-based CR survey. The
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participants were encouraged to support and provide as valid and candid
information as possible.
4.5

Data Collection
All data were collected in one round of structured, anonymous surveys

with SLS engineers, managers, and administrative support who were actively
involved in making the decisions under study. The survey statistics for each CR
were:


CR 53 – Flight Termination System (FTS) Architecture Option 10A
o Survey Population: 44
o Survey Responses: 8 (per SurveyGizmo)
o Survey Success: 18%



CR 70 – Data Requirements List Update
o Survey population: 118
o Survey responses: 38 (per SurveyGizmo)
o Survey Success: 32%



CR 82 – Core Stage Forward Skirt Umbilical
o Survey population: 13
o Survey responses: 5 (per SurveyGizmo)


6 submits of survey



1 removal of indeterminate submittal+

o Survey Success: 38%
+

The data in this survey submittal could not be rationalized. Vague and

conflicting answers were consistently provided throughout the survey input. With
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an anonymous survey, an inability to contact the individual for clarification, and
an inability to rationalize the contradicting answers, the decision was made to
remove the indeterminate submittal from analysis.
4.6

Human Subject Testing
To ensure the ethical treatment of human subjects, the following

conditions were met within this study: 1) anonymity was stated and guaranteed
for the participants, 2) data would be reported collectively per CR, 3) participating
organization gave consent, and 4) every participant was over 19 years of age.
Due to an oversight, the Institute Review Board (IRB) approval was not pursued.
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CHAPTER V

DATA RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Data results for the three areas of exploration (i.e., process, problem
identification, and success) are presented and analyzed within this chapter. First,
observed discrepancies in the data and how those discrepancies were handled will
be explained followed by the presentation of the survey data results and analyses.
A summary of the main findings and key decision drivers determined from the
study conclude the chapter.
5.1

Observed Data Discrepancies
Two data discrepancies were observed in the survey results. Each of these

discrepancies will be briefly explained to provide a better understanding of how
the discrepancy data was assessed within the data analyses presented and
discussed throughout this chapter.
5.1.1

‘Other’ Category Discrepancy
When the survey was originally launched, a glitch was discovered where

respondents could not submit the survey if a couple of questions were left blank.
The issue was quickly rectified, and the survey re-launched. However, in a few
occurrences of the early data submittals, the ‘Other’ data field captured benign
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verbiage, such as “The survey required a response in this block.” as one example.
This data was compiled and included in the complete data set of survey results in
this study; however, the erroneous data did not carry any weight or provide any
value in the final data analysis of the results for the overall study. Consequently,
if there was no justification given or additional explanation for the ‘Other’
category of responses in this data analysis write-up, it was because it was related
to the few occurrences of these benign answers received.
5.1.2

Percentages >100% Discrepancy
The respondents were asked to “Check One” for an answer to the

questions in the survey; however, the respondents would, in a few occurrences,
check two or three answers for a question. An example of such an occurrence
was with survey question: How were you notified of this CR for assessment?
Options available were “Direct email from CM”, “Email from DLE/EDLE”,
“Verbal from DLE/EDLE”, and “Other”. The respondents were asked to select
one; however, a few respondents checked multiple answers. Furthermore,
SurveyGizmo would count the number of answers given for each answer and
divide that by the total number of respondents for the question. Consequently, in
these instances of multiple answers given, the total percentage resulted in a value
greater than 100. Nine out of 27 questions across all three CRs resulted in
multiple answers given and percentages exceeding 100%. In each case, the
percentages were normalized for analysis and were denoted with an asterisk in the
title of the data results within this chapter.
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5.2

Definition of 75% Delineator
Poole and Van de Ven (2010) surmised that process research is all about

finding temporal patterns, and the forms of the representation contributes
significantly to pattern recognition. In an empirical study of decision making
processes, Poole and Roth (1989) developed a three-tier, phasic timeline that
tracks the task functions and the working relationships of a group to the
percentage of the discussion the group has at various phases of decision making.
They determined that the 75% marking on the timeline denoted the optimal level
of participation and communication amongst the decision makers for the
formulation and realization of strategic decision solutions. Consequently, a value
of 75% was selected as a delineator in the assessment of process effectiveness.
This 75% delineator was utilized in the evaluation of the frequency that the
desired selectable answers to the survey questions were chosen by the CR
respondents. The reasoning was the more often a desired answers was selected,
the more effective the respondents found the process to be.
5.3

Process Results and Analysis
There were nine process-oriented questions pertaining to the three CRs.

The results will be discussed in the following sections.
5.3.1

Results per Question

Q1: Who (person or group) generated the CR?
•

CR 53
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•

88% (representing 7 out 8 respondents) answered a combination of
EV72 and/or Flight System Safety Working Group which was
consistent with the originating organization listed on the CR

•

22% of respondents answered with a broader entity such as System
Engineering / SLS Systems Engineering & Integration (SE&I)

•

CR 70
•

47% (18 out of 38 respondents) answered a combination of EE12
and/or Configuration Management Office which was consistent with
the originating organization listed on the CR

•

11% (4 of 38 respondents) identified other organizations they thought
were the originator

•

•

•

QD02

•

Change Package Manager

8% of the respondents could not recall an originator
•

Do not know

•

Don't have time to go look this up

•

Unknown

Lastly, like earlier with CR53, 34% of the respondents (13 of the 38)
answered with a broader entity such as SLS System Engineering as the
originator

•

•

Level II SE&I

•

SLS SEI Management

CR 82
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•

80% (4 out of 5 respondents) answered a combination of EV74 and/or
SLS Vehicle Integration which was consistent with the originator
organization listed on the CR

•

20% representing a single respondent thought the Core Stage element
originated the change request

Across all three CRs under study, an average of 72% of the respondents had a
decent understanding and awareness of what organization and/or individual
originated the change request and to whom they provided comments.
Q2: How were you notified of this CR for assessment?
83%
60% 57%

0%
Direct Email from
CM
CR 53
60%
CR 70
57%
CR 82
83%

10%

0%

Email from
DLE/EDLE
0%
10%
0%

10%

17%

30% 33%

0%

Verbal from
DLE/EDLE
10%
0%
17%

0%
Other
30%
33%
0%

Figure 5.1 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 2 Results*
An average of 67% of the respondents indicated they were identified as
mandatory reviewers of the change request via the original distribution email
from the SLS CM Release Desk. This initial contact from the SLS CM Release
Desk was typically and appropriately formal. This percentage indicated the right
technical disciplines were researched and identified early for review of the
engineering change. An additional 12% were notified less formally via email or
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verbal request from a manager-type to review the change request. The final 21%
were notified by ‘Other’ means such as:


Email from DLE agent



Verbal from a LSE



Email from office SLS and/or MPCV CM support



Verbal from a FTS Trade Team representative



Not notified

Q5: Do you believe you provided a needed contribution to the CR assessment?
75%
25%

11%

89%

80%

20%

No. Didn't need to contribute & had no
comment
CR 53
25%
CR 70
11%
CR 82
20%

Yes
75%
89%
80%

Figure 5.2 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 5 Results*
Considering all three CRs, 75-90% of respondents felt they provided a necessary
and beneficial contribution to the CR reviews.
Q6: Would the assessment have benefited from additional expertise or input?

68

100%

83%

80%

0%
No
100%
83%
80%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

20%

17%
Yes
0%
17%
20%

Figure 5.3 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 6 Results*
By the input of “no additional expertise needed” from an average of 88% of the
survey respondents, it appeared the process proved effective in including the right
expertise to review, rationalize, and discuss impacts, risks, and workable solutions
of the CRs. For the other 12%, most of the comments received suggested that
lack of resources (time, budget) were the reason additional expertise would have
helped.
Q11: Were you involved in the discussion of any impacts stemming from the dispositioned comments from the review of the CR? If not, please explain.

25%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

22%

38%

34%

0%

20%

No, not al all

Yes, informally (i.e.,
through DLE, EDLE, etc.)

25%
22%
0%

38%
34%
20%

38%

80%

Yes, formally via direct
Table Top / Task Team /
Control Board Review(s)
38%
44%
80%

Figure 5.4 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 11 Results*
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44%

The majority (>80%) of the respondents were actively involved, formally or
informally, in the CR decision assessments and deliberations regarding the
magnitude of risks and consequences of those risks. While most of the
respondents were involved in potential impact discussions and resolution plans,
there were a minority of respondents who were not involved. The following
question provided insight into respondent exclusion from potential impact
discussions.
Q12: Why were respondents not involved in impact discussions?
•

Reviewer oversight or Reviewer unaware of impacts or discussions regarding
them
o Without my knowledge, a decision was made to eliminate a [Data
Requirements Description/Definition] DRD that affected the document
within my responsibility.
o Email communication [was] used for dispositions. Minimal info as to
impacts and little info as to big picture effects.
o Just focused on the disposition of my comments via email. I was not
involved in any group discussion.

•

Either had no comments or had non-trivial editorial comments
o I did not have any comments nor did anyone from my organization.
CR53 was a well-vetted change prior to the CR release.
o Comment was "editorial", no discussion required.

•

Reviewer only involved at CECB level
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o Outside of the CR presentation to the CECB, I was not involved in any
discussion of comments.
Q13: If you were involved in impact discussions, how were you notified of the
Table Top or Task Team Review for this CR?
67%
43% 40%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

Direct email to
review
43%
40%
67%

28% 28%

17%

Email from DLE /
EDLE to review
28%
28%
17%

15% 12% 17%

15% 20%

Verbal from DLE /
EDLE to review
15%
12%
17%

0%
Other
15%
20%
0%

Figure 5.5 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 13 Results*
Verbal and/or written (i.e., email) notifications from the CR CPE and/or SLS
discipline management were the dominate methods practiced when notifying the
respondents of CR discussions regarding impacts, consequences, and
workarounds. The notification and communication at this stage in the process
was more informal and appeared appropriate. An average of 12% of respondents
was notified of CR discussions by other methods as described in the follow-on
question.
Q14: What were ‘Other’ means of review notification?
•

Email from task team representative from within home organization

•

I was involved in control board reviews, not table tops.
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•

I was notified by the document owner, LSE and through the formal Booster
CM process.

•

I was involved in a division assessment of the impact. The division
management assessed the scope and provided a cost impact. Coordinated with
my management and not directly to the CR.

Q17: When did the decision / approval of the CR officially get to you
(approximate month and year) or Never?
50%
40%
30%

40%
35%
25%
16%

13%11%
0%

Calendar
Timeframe
CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

50%
30%
40%

Control
Board
Reference
25%
35%
40%

0%

20%

13%
0%

Don’t Know

Never

13%
11%
0%

0%
16%
0%

8%
0%

0%

0%

Repository
Receive
Update Office Notice
13%
0%
20%

0%
8%
0%

Figure 5.6 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 17 Results
It appears all respondents were aware of the approval of the CRs with the
exception of 6 respondents (i.e., 16%) on CR70 who were never notified of the
decision or approval of CR70. With respect to the calendar timeframe inputs, the
accuracy in answering was dependent on the respondents’ memory. The inputs
ranged over 2-6 month intervals for each CR. One thought on the variance in the
timeframe answers was that the respondents may have been involved in the PCB
where the CR was final approved and gave that date as a reference. Other
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respondents may have given another date based on the official receipt of the final
approved document with all changes and decisions incorporated. Depending on
the magnitude of comments, the document update and release could have taken a
few months post PCB approval.
5.3.2

CR Process Analysis
All the answers submitted by the survey respondents with respect to the

process-oriented questions have been detailed earlier in this chapter. This section
will attempt to determine the effectiveness of the CR change control process by
evaluating the desired answers selectable for the process-oriented questions
against the survey results from the respondents’ answers across all three CRs.
When analyzing the change control process, the desired choices were identified as
receiving official notifications of the change and of meetings and/or discussions
about the change and possessing a good understanding of who initiated the
change, its purpose, reviewer expectations, and time constraints for review,
decision formulation, and CR approval. Table 5.1 lists these desired answers and
the resulting percentages for each CR.
Table 5.1 Desired Selectable Answers for Process
Desired Selectable Answers

CR53 CR70 CR82

Received official CM notification email

60%

57%

83%

Understood who originated the CR and why

88%

47%

80%

Provided a needed contribution to the CR decision

75%

89%

80%

Felt adequately involved in impact discussions

76%

78%

100%

Felt adequately involved in formal reviews

71%

68%

84%

Knew when the CR was approved

88%

73%

100%
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The CR results for the desired process related questions ranged from a
lowest value of 47% to a highest value of 100%. Evaluation of the three CR
results with a 75% delineator revealed that the CR82 respondents observed no
process inefficiencies, the CR53 respondents observed a few, and the CR70
respondents observed the most inefficiencies in the processing of the DRL update.
The CR53 results ranged from 60% to 88% for the desired process-oriented
questions with results falling below the 75% delineator in the notification of the
vehicle flight software architecture change and Table Top Reviews. The CR70
process related results ranged from 47% to 89% with percentages falling below
75% in understanding the CR origination and purpose as well as in the
notification of the CR, team reviews, and resulting CR approval. Improvements
within the communication realm of the process are suggested, especially when
16% of the CR70 respondents were unaware of the official approval of the CR on
which they participated. The results reflecting CR70 as having the most process
inefficiencies appear logical since the baseline SLS CR change control process
was revamped during that CR review.
5.4

Problem Identification Results and Analysis
There were eleven problem identification questions pertaining to the three

CRs. The results will be discussed in the following sections.
5.4.1

Results per Question

Q4: What was your motivation in reviewing the CR?
•

CR53
o To establish a FTS architecture for SLS

74



Participated in the decisional process for the FTS architecture,
which resulted in having this CR be generated



Gain knowledge of the Flight Termination System (FTS)

o Ensure consistency among Cross-Programs and other activities


Making sure it has the appropriate considerations relative to
ground operation activities



To assess that the change was consistent with trade study
results and an agreed to option



Understand if impact to crew vehicle was acceptable



Ensure the specific Flight Termination Architecture definition
that is required to be represented in the SLS technical baseline
is documented in the appropriate interface control document.

o Safety


Concern that FTS implementation could lead to a safety risk
and a future redesign to mitigate the safety risk. Architecture
seemed to be driven by a view to simplify a design (i.e.,
remove components) rather than a full integrated stack systems
view.

•

CR70
o Mandatory Evaluator


DLE role



It's part of my job

o Accuracy of technical / discipline-specific data in DRL
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Responsible for the development of several documents affected
by this CR / Motivated to ensure the accuracy of the data in the
DRL / This document affects my work / To ensure that my
input to the document was correctly implemented / Ensure the
documents under my functional team were accurately captured
in terms of content and delivery milestones.



We needed to review the CR to ensure that our organizations
[Data Requirements Description/Definition] DRDs were
correctly represented and that there were no impacts to our
organization relative to other DRDs



The DRL is like the Rosetta Stone for all the pertinent
information regarding products generated by one discipline and
products generated by other disciplines in which there are
many stakeholders. Need to assure program integration
between the vehicle and ground services occurs smoothly /
Reviewing content relative to ground operations deliverables /
Having the necessary documentation properly identified and
baselined.



CR was related to the SLS DRL which directly affects the
SPIO Element by defining data products required from payload
integration team.



Review for correctness from the standpoint of Integrated
Avionics and Software (IAS)
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o Align with Agency, Center and Cross Program requirements


Ensure the program had the correct deliverables identified in
order to comply with Agency and Center requirements for the
development of the program.



This was a Cross Program change request that could impact
another Program or ESD



To ensure DRL would adequately address changes to category
1 and 2 documentation associated with verification and
validation needs across all programs.

o Deliverables alignment and document flow to external entities


It directly impacted deliverables from the element office(s) and
external entities with potential for cost impact / Assure
alignment between L2 expectations for data deliveries from the
elements / Interested from perspective of proper classification
of documents for proper flow down to external entities

•

CR82
o Assigned as a mandatory reviewer


Part of the job

o Accuracy of technical / discipline-specific data


Document owner

o Ensure consistency among Cross-Programs and other activities


Minimize operational and interface impacts between the
vehicle and ground operations
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Q6: Would the assessment have benefited from additional expertise or input?
100%

83%

80%

0%
No
100%
83%
80%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

17%

20%

Yes
0%
17%
20%

Figure 5.7 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 6 Results*
Between 80 and 100% of the respondents believed the technical assessment they
provided was sufficient.
Q7: If yes, what expertise would have improved the CR assessment?
•

Objective independent assessment presented to the Cross-Program tech
authorities

•

Vice identifying specific expertise, respondents tried to justify why certain
expertise was not included
o

Unclear scope


Unsure if individual knew if all documents were necessary [on
CR 70]

o Limited resources


There are limited amount of resources to review all CRs, each
organization tries to place those with the most expertise on the

78

CR; however, there is a lack of planning of CRs to ensure that
SMEs are not overburdened with CR reviews. (CR70)


Additional expertise is always needed but that need has to be
balanced with the cost of managing excessive input. I believe
the balance achieved for this revision was reasonable. (CR 70)

Q8: Do you feel you had adequate time and/or readily available CR related
materials to perform an assessment of this CR?
100%

0%
CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

84%

20%

16%
No
0%
16%
20%

Yes
100%
84%
80%

Figure 5.8 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 8 Results
The data showed that the majority of the respondents felt they had adequate time
and resources available for the review of each CR; however, there were a few
concerns as explained in the following question.
Q9: If no, what hindered your review?
•

Unclear change purpose or intent
o CR 82 was an urgent CR when it came out. The
information/background about it was very confusing. Real
understanding of the thrust arrived when CR was explained at the
board.
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80%

•

Insufficient time / Workload
o Needed more time to fully review this document
o Heavy review load including other CRs and documents
o While the review period for this CR (70) was sufficient for one CR of
this magnitude, this CR was not the only one under review. That is the
price of a tight schedule; multiple changes being reviewed
simultaneously by the same experts. We do the best we can, and
request extensions when we feel we cannot accomplish an appropriate
review. But there's never enough time to do it all.
o Preparation for internal milestone review. CM system had a number of
changes in the system to review.

Q15: Do you think your comments were assessed adequately in the Table Top or
Task Team Review process?
97%
67%
33%
3%
CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

0%

No
33%
3%
0%

Yes
67%
97%
100%

Figure 5.9 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 15 Results*
The data showed the majority of the respondents across all 3 CRs thought their
comments were adequately assessed. The explanation of the 33% dissension was
explained in the follow-on question.
80

100%

Q16: If no, please explain.
•

The future implications [of FTS option 10A] were not given much
consideration. The future configurations [were] not viewed as design
considerations.
o I felt the solution was workable but we did not adequately consider
future implications or risk in operational scenarios.

Q18: Did you fully understand the CR decision and its implementation plan? If
not, what would have aided your understanding?
100%

0%

8%

80%

20%

No
0%
8%
20%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

92%

Yes
100%
92%
80%

Figure 5.10 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 18 Results
Across each of the 3 CRs, 80-100% of the respondents understood the resulting
decisions and the implementation plans for the decisions. Issues that impacted
understanding were listed in the next question.
Q19: If not, what would have aided your understanding?
•

A better big picture understanding of intent of CR [70] and what problems it
was solving.

•

We were plowing new ground with what it meant to execute a hard T-0 design
-- that design is still in work after all these months. (CR 82)
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Q22: Were there any gaps in communication during the CR review?
100%
74%

60%
18%

20%

0%
CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

No
100%
74%
60%

8%

0%
Yes, minor
0%
18%
20%

20%

Yes, major
0%
8%
20%

Figure 5.11 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 22 Results
On average, 78% of the respondents experienced no communication issues, 13%
experienced minor communication gaps, and 9% of the respondents saw major
issues in communication. The next question addressed the major and minor
communication issues identified by 22% of the survey respondents.
Q23: If yes, what were they?
•

Unclear cost impacts
o Lack of understanding life cycle cost impacts
o Cost assessment was not performed until the CR was out for formal
review. Several significant cost impacts had to be worked out through
the board process.
o Some entities "piled on" with cost impacts at the PCB meeting instead
of writing the cost impacts down formally through comments.
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o Unclear cost impacts from some parties in the days leading up to the
boards which resulted in "piling on" a bit at the board meetings. This
was minor, though.
•

Unclear deliverables schedule
o Updates required inputs to be scheduled per the SLS-SCHE-164
[document] which did not accompany the CR. No communication as
to how the scheduling of deliveries would be handled.

•

Unclear SLS Task Team Review Process
o The SLS Task Team review is a bit confusing to most outside
organizations - who participates, how are they chosen, how are they
notified. Also sometimes a gap in closing the loop with CR
reviewers/commenters

•

Unclear content / scope of change
o This CR [70] was release in 2012 and then re-released in 2013 as R1.
There was some question as to what was retained in the comments
from R0 review to R1 - just caused additional review of the R1
version.

•

Unrealistic review process for substantial changes
o The method of doing changes of this importance and magnitude is
broken. The DRL is a document that should be given mandated
undivided attention though it is just one of many priorities when it is
worked as part of an existing program. The magnitude of the change
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and the method of review of the changes and inputs from the various
commenters created a communication nightmare.
•

Unclear purpose
o [CR 82] was an urgent CR whose intent was not well communicated.
Couldn't figure out the thrust of the change via the email notification
alone.

•

Difficult integration across 3 programs
o Getting to an integrated Cross-Program objective story was difficult to
achieve as some entities were already ahead in their work and any
vehicle changes resulted in significant SLS cost impacts; essentially
put the onus on one Program to comply with the vehicle-focused
[Vehicle Stability System] VSS design.

Q24: Were there cost or schedule impacts due to communication glitches during
the CR review?
88%

87%

80%

12%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

No
88%
87%
80%

13%
Yes
12%
13%
20%

Figure 5.12 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 24 Results
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20%

From the previous question, an average of 78% of total survey respondents
reported no communication issues, while 22% reported experiencing
communication gaps and identified them. An interesting data point here was that
previously, the CR53 respondents reported no communication gaps during the
review; however, in this question, one out of the eight CR53 respondents felt
there were resource impacts to cost or schedule and related them to
communication gaps. Therefore, it was difficult to conclude that any cost or
schedule impacts relate directly back to the 22% that recognized communication
issues during the CR processing. However, strictly assessing the data as
presented here, 80-88% of respondents, across all 3 CRs, who recognized
communication issues, did not see those impacting substantial resources such as
cost and schedule. The 12-20% of those respondents that did see cost or schedule
impacts due to ineffective communication provided specific examples as reflected
in the next question.
Q25: If yes [there were cost or schedule impacts], what were they?
•

Time / Schedule
o The CR [70] had to be delayed multiple times due to its size and
complexity.
o The amount of time needed to work through the [CR 70] Rev D
impacts took valuable time that would have otherwise been used on
other tasks. This created stress on the employees attempting to meet
dates that were being pushed hard to keep the program, or Level II
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schedule on track, without concern for the schedule impact to the
element.
•

Cost
o Unsure cost impacts were fully vetted by the design solution at the
time of the PCB. (CR 53)
o Getting to an integrated Cross-Program objective story was difficult to
achieve as some entities were already out ahead in their work and any
vehicle changes resulted in significant SLS cost impacts. (CR 82)

•

Cost and Schedule
o Lack of understanding life cycle cost impacts of missed design
influence decisions resulting in schedule delays. (CR 70)

5.4.2

CR Problem Identification Analysis
All the answers submitted by the survey respondents with respect to the

problem identification questions were detailed in 5.4.1. An analysis of the
effectiveness of the CR change control process by analyzing whether blatant
and/or underlying problems were evident will be discussed in this section.
Specifically, an assessment of how the desired answers selectable for the problem
identification questions performed against the survey inputs from the respondents’
answers across all three CRs will be evaluated. What are desired choices when
attempting to identify and rectify problems arising during the decision making
process of the three CRs in study? Those were identified as participant
motivation to review and ensure compliance, correct expertise identified for
assessment, adequate time for review, adequate information accessible for review,
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adequate bidirectional participatory discussion of technical inputs and risk
mitigation and/or management, and finally, understanding the resulting decision.
Table 5.2 lists these desired answers selectable and the resulting percentages for
each CR.
Table 5.2 Desired Selectable Answers for Problem Identification
Desired Selectable Answers

CR53 CR70 CR82

Motivated for technical accuracy and compliance
among Cross Program

100%

80%

60%

Needed no additional expertise

100%

83%

80%

Adequate time for review

100%

84%

80%

Adequate assessment from review

67%

97%

100%

Understood decision

100%

92%

80%

No communication gaps

100%

74%

60%

Observed no cost/schedule impacts

88%

87%

80%

The CR results for the desired problem identification questions ranged
from a lowest value of 60% to a highest value of 100%. Evaluation of the three
CR results with a 75% delineator revealed that the CRs were collectively above
average for having adequate expertise and review periods assigned for CR
evaluation, for identifying and/or mitigating impacts to budget or schedule, and
for possessing a team consensus in the understanding of the resulting decisions.
While most of the CR results favored the desired answers, there were, however, a
few problems identified by each CR during the review, communication, and
decision making process. The CR53 results showed a 67% rating for the
assessment of comments during the Table Top Review process, CR70 narrowly
missed the delineator mark with a 74% rating on communication, and the CR82
87

results were 60% both in motivation and communication. Specifics of these
process hindrances were:
•

Adequate Assessment
o CR53 respondents understood the resulting decision for the FTS
architecture and considered the software upgrade workable, but one
respondent felt future implications with the upgrade were not been
adequately assessed.

•

Communication Gaps:
o CR53 identified no communication issues while twelve CR70
respondents and two CR82 respondents identified communication
ambiguities with cost, schedule, review iterations, task team roles and
responsibilities, and the integration process across the three Cross
Programs.



Motivation:
o All of the CR53 respondents identified technical considerations and
coordination strategies with the Cross Program entities to establish a
viable and safe FTS architecture as the motivation for the CR
processing. Twenty-eight out of thirty-five respondents on CR70
revealed similar motivation strategies. For CR82, three respondents
shared a desire for technical accuracy and compliance across the Cross
Programs whereas two respondents commented their motivation was
“part of the job” which may or may not have been a positive
motivator.
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Legitimate problems were identified during the processing of the three
CRs under study. Despite these problematic issues, the respondents reviewed,
debated, and rationalized the decisional information as necessary to reach
consensual decisions and programmatic approvals of the CRs. Overall, the
decision making and communication within the CR processing was above
average; however, based on the respondents’ feedback, there exist areas of
improvement within the SLS CR change control process to be addressed and
refined.
5.5

Success Results and Analysis
There were nine success-oriented questions pertaining to the three CRs.

The results will be discussed in the following sections.
5.5.1

Results per Question

Q5: Do you believe you provided a needed contribution to the CR assessment?
75%
25%

11%

89%

80%

20%

No. Didn't need to contribute & had no
comment
CR 53
25%
CR 70
11%
CR 82
20%

Yes
75%
89%
80%

Figure 5.13 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 5 Results*
Greater than 75% of the respondents across the three CRs felt they provided a
necessary and beneficial contribution to the CR reviews.
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Q10: If your answer to Question 5 was 'Yes', how do you feel your comments
were received and dis-positioned?
60%

65%

60%

40%

35%

40%
0%

0%

0%

Well. Lots of discussion to
Fair. Minimal
Poor. My comments were
make my comments
communication (mainly
ignored or dismissed.
understood.
via email).
CR 53
60%
40%
0%
CR 70
65%
35%
0%
CR 82
60%
40%
0%
Figure 5.14 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 10 Results
All of the respondents felt their comments were adequately received and assessed.
Q15: Do you think your comments were assessed adequately in the Table Top or
Task Team Review process?
97%
67%
33%
3%
CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

0%

No
33%
3%
0%

Yes
67%
97%
100%

Figure 5.15 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 15 Results*
Between 67% and 100% of the respondents across the three CRs felt their
comments were adequately assessed during the Table Top or Task Team Review
meetings. The one exception in CR53 was explained in the following question.
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100%

Q16: If no, please explain.
•

The future implications [of FTS option 10A] were not given much
consideration. The future configurations [were] not viewed as design
considerations.
o Solution was workable but did not adequately consider future
implications or risk in operational scenarios.

Q18: Did you fully understand the CR decision and its implementation plan? If
not, what would have aided your understanding?
100%

0%

8%

80%

20%

No
0%
8%
20%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

92%

Yes
100%
92%
80%

Figure 5.16 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 18 Results
Between 80% and 100% of respondents across the CRs understood the resulting
decisions and corresponding implementation plans. Issues that impacted the
understanding of CR70 and CR82 decisions were explained in the next question.
Q19: If not, what would have aided your understanding?
•

A better big picture understanding of intent of CR [70] and what problems it
was solving.

•

We were plowing new ground with what it meant to execute a hard T-0 design
-- that design is still in work after all these months. (CR 82)
91

Q20: To what degree did you agree with the decision?

0% 0% 0%

13%

25%
0% 0%

28%
13%

0%

40%

0%
0%
0%

13%
0%
0%

25%
13%
0%

59% 60%

13%

Disagreed but
Ambivalent and Moderately
Not at all (0%) understood
workable (50%) agree (80%)
rationale (30%)
CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

50%

Completely
agree (100%)

13%
28%
40%

50%
59%
60%

Figure 5.17 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 20 Results*
The majority of the survey respondents found the resulting decisions to be
agreeable and workable. The 13% dissenting opinion for CR53 came from a
respondent who disagreed with the FTS architecture decision but understood the
rationale for the decision. The respondent commented:
•

While the option selected had some benefits, the other option was less
complex, [had] no interfaces to deal with, and reduced the mass on the Core
Stage.

Q26: From your perspective, were your concerns with this CR dealt with
effectively?

92

57%

43%

40%
25% 20%

0% 3% 0%
No, not at all

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

0%
3%
0%

0%

8%

0%

39% 40%

25%
0%

Somewhat but
not adequately
0%
8%
0%

Acceptable
43%
25%
20%

Moderately
effective
0%
25%
40%

Highly effective
57%
39%
40%

Figure 5.18 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 26 Results*
Among the three CRs under study, the majority of the respondents commented
that they felt their inputs to the CR change process and their contributions to the
resulting decisions were adequately and effectively handled. However, there were
a few dissensions with respect to CR70. One respondent answered this question
with “No, not at all” and added a comment that the respondent did not review the
CR. Therefore for assessment purposes, no review of the CR equated to no
concerns with the processing of the CR. For the next category of “Somewhat but
not adequately”, a couple of CR70 respondents provided the following comments
to explain why they felt this answer was appropriate with respect to their inputs to
the CR:
•

One of my comments was rejected due to the elimination of [Data
Requirements Description/Definition] DRD without my knowledge.

•

Cost swept under the rug, as they have been for other changes. Level II
requirements drove cost that the elements had to find a way to make happen
with no additional money.
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Q27: From your perspective, how would you describe the decision process with
respect to this CR?
56% 52% 60%
0% 3%

20%

Very difficult
and/or
frustrating and
not effective
CR 53
0%
CR 70
3%
CR 82
20%

22% 23% 20%

0% 5% 0%
Difficult and
somewhat
effective

Effective but
inefficient

0%
5%
0%

22%
23%
20%

22% 17%

Sufficiently
Highly effective
effective and
and very
somewhat
efficient
inefficient
56%
22%
52%
17%
60%
0%

Figure 5.19 Summation of SLS CR Survey Question 27 Results*
An averaged majority of 91% across all three CRs observed the decision process
to be effective. This percentage broke down to: 22% of all respondents viewed
the decision process as effective but inefficient, 56% viewed the decision process
as sufficiently effective and somewhat inefficient, and 13% of the respondents
viewed the decision process as highly effective and very efficient. For the other
end of the spectrum, an average of 9% of the survey respondents found the
process to be difficult, specifically expressing the decision process to be very
difficult, frustrating, and ineffective. The following data addressed the difficult
and ineffective process examples identified by the survey respondents.
•

CR Review Process
o The CR and Table Top process is long and time consuming. There are
areas that can be eliminated and improved. (CR 82)
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0%

o The perseverance of the professionals that we had working the product
was the only reason the CR [70] made it through the process at all. In
other words, the process did not help, the work got done (mostly) in
spite of the process.
o Never given enough time to review any CRs. (CR 70)
•

CR Scope / Content
o The most inefficient part, in my opinion, was caused by people adding
documents to their scope without updating the DRL. This happened
before the CR [70] was sent out for review. Granted, it is a by-product
of the phase of program we were in, and things have tightened down
since that time.
o Inefficient because there were so many changes associated with this
CR [70] it was difficult to keep up with understanding changes
provided by other commenters.

•

CR Cost Impacts
o This CR [70] had to be withdrawn and re-released (as SLS-00070R1)
due to cost impacts from various entities. The process worked, but it
might have been more efficient had cost impacts been addressed
during the task team process.
o Hard to present an objective story because of out of synch schedules.
Any design changes were major cost impacts to the Program. (CR82)
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5.5.2

CR Success Analysis
All the answers submitted by the survey respondents with respect to the

success-oriented questions were detailed in 5.5.1. An analysis of the success of
the overall decision making and communication practices exercised within the CR
change control process will be discussed in this section. As conducted on the
previous survey assessments for the process and problem identification questions,
an evaluation of how the desired answers selectable for the success-oriented
questions performed against the actual survey answers from the respondents
across all three CRs will be analyzed. The desired choices for the successoriented questions were identified as those where the respondents felt they made a
necessary and valuable contribution to the review and resulting decision, where
their comments and contributions were acknowledged and adequately assessed,
where they understood and agreed with the resulting decision, and lastly, where
they exhibited a high degree of confidence in the effectiveness of the decision
making process. These desired answers selectable and the resulting percentages
for each CR for that answer are listed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Desired Selectable Answers for Success
Desired Selectable Answers

CR53

CR70

CR82

Provided needed contribution to CR assessment

75%

89%

80%

Adequate comment disposition

100%

100%

100%

Adequate assessment from review

67%

97%

100%

Understood decision

100%

92%

80%

Moderately agreed to completely agreed with decision

63%

87%

100%

CR concerns acceptably to highly effectively assessed

100%

89%

100%

Sufficiently to highly effective decision making process

78%

69%

60%
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The CR results for the desired success-oriented questions ranged from a
lowest value of 60% to a highest value of 100%. Evaluation of the three CR
results with a 75% delineator revealed that the CRs were collectively above
average for having respondents who felt they provided a needed contribution to
the CR assessments, felt their comments were assessed highly effectively, and
understood the resulting decisions. A majority of the CR results favored a desired
success (i.e., >75%) indicating positive influences of success for the decision
making process; however, there were four less desirable occurrences in comment
assessment, decision agreement, and decision making process effectiveness.
Respondents for CR70 and CR82 showed higher percentages of satisfaction in
how their comments were assessed during team reviews and in agreement with
the resulting decision than the CR53 respondents where the CR53 results were
67% and 63%, respectively. In the case of decision agreement, the CR53
respondent moderately agreed with the decision but completely understood the
rationale and thereby supported the resulting decision. Despite the CR53 less
desirable results for comment assessment and decision agreement, the CR53
respondents ranked the overall decision making process as sufficiently to highly
effective and yielded the highest ranking amongst the three CRs. This data result
seemed illogical since CR70 and CR82 had exceeded the 75% delineator in all the
desired areas except this one decision making process effectiveness descriptor that
yielded percentages of 69% and 60%, respectively. While the SLS CR change
control process worked and decisions were made, there were, however, observed
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scope, ambiguity, and resource issues that hindered the overall decision making
and communication process as reflected in these recorded comments:
•

If disciplines would have done a due diligence and understood the
affordability tenant upfront this [DRL] would have been a better product.

•

This [CR70] was a large, difficult CR to deal with because of its scope. But,
given that scope, I feel the actual CR process itself worked fairly well. Cost
impacts were generated which were dis-positioned at the boards. Ultimately
the CR was re-scoped due to a board decision to not absorb the original costs.
It would have been better to work changes in scope (such as new documents,
etc.) with decision-makers earlier, instead of waiting until this CR, but
considering that this did not happen the CR process itself did what it was
supposed to do.

•

Any changes [for CR82] were major cost impacts to the Program.
Despite the observed hindrances, the level of respondent knowledge, skill,

and involvement applied to the technical evaluations, discussions, and decisions
proved to be sufficiently effective as reflected in the survey results.
5.6

Summation of Main Findings
The data results across all three CRs under study revealed that all

comments from the CR respondents were adequately acknowledged and assessed.
The data results showed that an average greater than 80% of the CR respondents
were not only actively involved in the CR deliberations concerning the technical
changes including risks and consequences of those risks, but they also felt they
made necessary contributions to the resulting decisions. Additionally, an average
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greater than 90% of the CR respondents said that they not only fully understood
both the CR decisions and the implementation plans, but they also agreed with the
decisions. While the majority of the respondents felt involved in the reviews and
formulation of the consensual decisions, there were less than 20% of the
respondents who voiced not being involved in impact discussions or aware of the
official approval of the CRs.
When the CR respondents were asked to describe the decision process, an
average of 96% of the respondents across all three CRs described the decision
making process as effective. Nine percent, however, observed the process as
difficult and ineffective stating inefficiencies in the time allocations and the SMEs
assignments to the review of CRs. With respect to communication within the
decision making process, an average of 78% of the CR respondents did not
experience or observe any issues in communication. Fifteen percent of the 22%
who confirmed experiencing communication issues said those issues resulted in
cost impacts due in large part to the inability of entities to perform cost
assessments correctly or consistently for the technical changes under review.
Communication proved effective in the formulation of decision recommendations
to be provided to and approved by the final decision authority; however, the
communication of the final decision and approved CR back down the hierarchy
was less effective.
Assessment of the CR data results identified four areas of process
improvement. These include the official notification of CR review and CR final
approval, the definition of the CR scope and/or purpose, and the inclusion of all
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reviewers in all facets of the CR process. While 67% of the respondents said they
were on the official email from the CM Release Desk, if it had not been for
informal emails and verbal requests from other parties, the CRs would not have
received adequate reviews. Similarly, the notification of the CR final approval
was inefficient because 16% of the respondents said they never received official
notification that the CRs were approved. Unclear scopes and/or expectations for
the technical review within the CRs were recurring comments from the
respondents. And lastly, less than 20% of the respondents, who had no comments
or non-trivial comments such as editorials, were not involved in review meetings
where impacts were discussed.
5.7

Key Decision Drivers
The respondents ranked attributes such as design/performance, cost,

schedule and risk in priority (top, second, third, lowest or not considered).
Weights were then applied to achieve an overall score.
Attribute Rank

Weight

Top Priority

4

2nd Priority

3

3rd Priority

2

Lowest Priority

1

Not Considered

0

The overall score per weighted attribute per CR was then normalized to
find the percentage breakdown for the attributes per CR. From Figure 5.20, it
appears cost followed closely by design/performance were the decision drivers for
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the FTS architecture change in CR53. Design followed closely by cost and
schedule were the decision drivers for CR70’s baseline update to the list of all
data requirements required for the SLS Program. Finally, design and cost tied for
the decision drivers for the change to the Core Stage forward skirt umbilical in
CR82. Across all three CRs under study, the resulting key drivers were
design/performance and cost for making the final decisions.
30% 29% 29%

32%

27% 29%

26% 24%
17%

CR 53
CR 70
CR 82

Design /
Performance
30%
29%
29%

Cost

Schedule

Risk

32%
27%
29%

17%
26%
24%

20%
18%
17%

Figure 5.20 Key Driver Results for SLS CR Decisions
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20% 18%
17%

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1

Conclusions
Evidence from the study of three decisions within the SLS CR change

control process suggested that SLS Program has consciously reviewed and
applied lessons learned from previous large-scale programs to the execution of the
SLS Program. Specific evidence findings of and recommendations for the SLS
decision making and communication processes will be discussed in this chapter.
6.1.1

Constellation Lessons Learned
Evidence suggested the SLS Program applied the lessons learned from the

Constellation Program to its decision making and communication processes. The
ESD within NASA Headquarters was accountable for ensuring that integration
was executed effectively, efficiently, and affordably across the three Cross
Programs. Specifically for the SLS Program, the program’s Configuration
Management and Data Management (CM/DM) repository provided insight into
the program-level documentation that defined how the SLS Program would
implement Cross Program and internal technical integration from design,
development, design analysis, test, and certification (SLS Integration Plan, 2013)
to systems engineering and integration roles, responsibilities, and processes
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specific to the integrated launch vehicle design and implementation (SLS Systems
Engineering Management Plan, 2013).
The SLS decisions under study were strategic with deliberations among a
group to reach a consensual recommendation presented forward to SLS Program
Management for final approval. The communication appeared to have been better
executed within the SLS Program than on Constellation; however, the SLS
communication process still needs improvement within the overall decision
making process.
6.1.2

SLS Decision Making Effectiveness
The SLS Program aimed to balance timely decision making at the

appropriate levels within the CR change control process. Before discussing the
SLS decision making effectiveness, evidence of how the SLS process aligned
with the plethora of research from decision theory experts such as Dean,
Sharfman, Reagan, and Shrivastava will be discussed.
6.1.2.1 SLS Decision Making Dimensions
The three dimensions of strategic decision making (i.e., procedural
rationality, politics, and complexity) were evident in the CR decision study.
Kelley & Thibaut (1969) theorized that the quality of information available to
decision makers is one of the most important determinants of successful decision
making. Evidence of procedural rationality relies upon analysis of this
information relevant to the decision in making a choice (Dean & Sharfman,
1993b). Survey results showed that all the respondents had readily available
material for review; however, the review time was an issue. The deficiency of
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adequate time to review is considered by Janis (1989) to be a negative influence
that can lead to decision analysis issues. Fortunately, this cognitive constraint
was not dominate, per the survey results, and did not appear to have hindered the
decision making process. Survey results also showed that all the respondents
contributed necessary CR comments with no comments being ignored but rather
all effectively assessed. Much review and discussion went into the comment dispositions and the analyses of impacts, risks, and constraints to arrive at the viable
strategic decision recommendations presented to the PM for final approval of
each CR.
Each of the Cross Programs (SLS, Orion, GSDO) across three NASA
Centers (MSFC, JSC, KSC) comprised its own specific processes, its own groups
of experts with varying motivations for involvement in the CR review, and its
own idiosyncrasies factoring into decision making. Consequently, politics was
introduced. An example of political imbalance of influence from the survey
results was “getting to an integrated Cross-Program objective story was difficult
to achieve as some entities were already out ahead in their work and any vehicle
changes resulted in significant SLS cost impacts; essentially put the onus on one
Program to comply with the vehicle-focused [Vehicle Stability System] VSS
design.” An example of political contention over objectives was “cost impacts
were not fully vetted by this design solution at the time of the PCB.” Another
example, “the method of doing changes to the DRL should be given mandated
undivided attention…suggestions of how this should work...the document owner
should be knowledgeable enough to make the decisions on changes to be
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made…then the document should be updated….provided…with changes
highlighted…and with a meeting to go through the document in a scheduled order
so commenters can attend when areas they are interested in are discussed. The
Table Top method of going through the spreadsheet one comment at a time was a
waste.”
Evidence of complexity included a confusing or unclear scope, intricate or
ambiguous data, and diverse or conflicting views, interests, and/or opinions
among the decision makers. All of these complexity issues were evident in the
survey results. For instance, one survey respondent cited, “a better big
picture…of intent of DRL CR [70] and what problems it was solving” would have
aided understanding. Another cited, “[CR 82] was an urgent CR whose intent
was not well communicated…couldn't figure out the thrust of the change via the
email notification alone.” There were also examples of intricate or ambiguous
data cited. For instance, “we were plowing new ground with what it meant to
execute a hard T-0 design…with that design…still in work after all these
months.” Other respondents cited examples from “several significant cost
impacts had to be worked out through the board process” to “CR [70] had to be
delayed multiple times due to its size and complexity…it was released…and then
re-released…as R1…there was some question as to what was retained in the
comments from R0 review to R1” to “the amount of time needed to work through
the [CR 70] Rev D impacts took valuable time that would have otherwise been
used on other tasks.” Lastly, survey examples of complexity stemming from
diverse or conflicting views and/or opinions were “unclear cost impacts from
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some parties in the days leading up to the boards…resulted in "piling on" at the
board meetings” to “the SLS Task Team review is…confusing to most outside
organizations…[understanding] who participates, how are they chosen, how are
they notified.”
Analysis of the evidence showed all three dimensions of strategic decision
making present in the assessments of the three SLS CRs. Politics and complexity
were evident in the multi-disciplined grouping of personnel with diverse skills,
mental models, and motivations evaluating each CR’s intricate and sometimes
unclear data. Application of decision tools fostered the rational processing to
reach consensual decisions.
6.1.2.2 SLS Decision Making Model
Evidence suggested that the SLS Program decision making process
tracked to a hybrid managerial autocracy and adaptive planning decision making
model. From the managerial autocracy model perspective, a large amount of
power and authority rested with the single key manager (i.e., SLS PM) who made
all SLS strategic decisions himself with technical assistance from several
subordinates (Shrivastava, 1983); however, the SLS PM did not bias the style and
preferences for reaching the decision or stifle the use of system tools, procedures,
and/or experience of the SLS organization in providing the necessary technical
assistance. From the adaptive planning model perspective, plans were viewed as
guidelines that were modified depending on the current analysis of issues.
Specific to the CRs, each one differed in technicality. One CR was software
related, another hardware related, and another pertained to documentation.
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Qualified SLS discipline experts systematically evaluated the technical merits of
each proposed change in an effort to achieve efficient and adaptable solutions to
the problem each CR presented (Shrivastava, 1983). Evidence suggested that the
SLS CR change control processing “involved systematic participation by relevant
members who could handle the technical complexity, evaluating risks and
environmental constraints, and effectively communicate information in which to
achieve viable strategic decisions and implementation plans that yielded solutions
to problems” (Shrivastava, 1983). Each CR reached final approval by the SLS
PM implying the SLS PM agreed with the decision recommendations provided by
the technical disciplines. Based on this analysis, the SLS Program decision
making process appeared to pattern a hybrid managerial autocracy and adaptive
planning decision making model.
6.1.2.3 SLS Decision Making Strategy
Evidence suggested that the decisions under study were traceable to a
judgment decision strategy employing the tractable-fluid decision making mode.
The survey results showed that the right disciplines were identified and included
at the appropriate levels/phases of the process. One respondent cited, “additional
expertise is always needed, but that need has to be balanced with the cost of
managing excessive input…the balance achieved for this revision was
reasonable.” Another cited, “while the review period for this CR was sufficient
for one CR of this magnitude, this CR was not the only one under review...that is
the price of a tight schedule…multiple changes being reviewed simultaneously by
the same experts…do the best we can…request extensions when…cannot
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accomplish an appropriate review…there's never enough time to do it all.”
Results also showed that all of the comments received were acknowledged with
the vast majority of the comments adequately dis-positioned. The survey results
reflected a couple of exceptions: “One of my comments was rejected due to the
elimination of DRD [Data Requirements Description] without my knowledge.”
and “Cost swept under the rug, just as...for other changes…Level II requirements
drove cost that the Elements had to find a way to make happen with no additional
money.” Similar results were evident for the process effectiveness in that the
majority of the survey respondents thought the overall process was effective with
a couple of exceptions. Respondents perceiving the process as difficult, very
frustrating, and ineffective cited, “[It is] hard to present an objective story because
of out of synch schedules…design changes were major cost impacts.” and “…the
magnitude of change and the importance of the document created an environment
where there was frustration at many levels…perseverance of the
professionals…working the product was the only reason the CR [70] made it
through the process.” The vast majority understood and agreed with the resulting
decisions. One respondent who did not agree with the resulting decision cited,
“While the option selected had some benefits…the other option was less complex,
no interfaces to deal with, and reduced the mass.” This respondent did not agree
with the decision but understood the rationale in which to support the decision
made. Evidence further revealed a medium-to-high level of complexity and
politics across the three CRs. One respondent cited communication issues
stemming from “cost impacts not fully vetted within the CR review.” Complexity
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of the large, complicated CR [70] made communication a struggle resulting in
cost, schedule and workload impacts. A corresponding survey comment cited, “A
large, difficult CR to deal with because of its scope…people are overloaded,
schedule is tough, decisions are hard, and everyone's not going to be happy in the
end…but…given that scope…the actual CR process itself worked fairly well.”
Also political comments reflecting an imbalance of influence and contention over
objectives made the politics within the decision making process high.
Consequently, analysis of the evidence suggested the common decision making
strategy for the three CRs approximates to the tractable-fluid decision mode
where the CR reviewers collaborated and scrutinized the details to reach
understanding and negotiated the resulting decisions (i.e., a judgment strategy).
6.1.2.4 SLS Decision Making Effectiveness
Evidence suggested that the decision making within the CR change control
process worked well from five perspectives: participatory identification, review
notification, reviewer involvement, input assessment, and decision formulation.
Survey evidence revealed the appropriate competencies were indeed identified as
necessary participants in the CR reviews, and those individuals felt they were
adequately notified of the reviews and in turn provided essential [or valuable]
inputs to the CR reviews, impact discussions, and the decision recommendations
that were presented to the final decision authority. Survey results further revealed
that all received comments were effectively assessed, that all of the participating
individuals understood the resulting CR decisions with the majority of them
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(>80%) agreeing with the decisions, and lastly that they considered the overall
decision making process to be effective and efficient.
While each CR completed its approval process differently, evidence
suggested that the SLS decision making process was less process dependent than
typical systems engineers might expect. The variation in CR approval process
appeared to have not impacted the overall decision making process and success of
each CR; instead, the tailored approach, as opposed to a standard process rigor,
was appropriate for each CR. As long as the process matched the needs of the
decision makers and an effort was made to get all needed individuals involved,
different processes appear to be used effectively.
Evidence from the CR study suggested the SLS Program was sufficiently
effective at making strategic decisions via a comprehensive decision making
process. As a guideline, a decision making process matters; however, a process
that is adaptable to a project’s needs (i.e., size, complexity, risk posture) is ideal.
Of all the survey responses, only one commenter disagreed with this premise
citing, “the process did not help, the work got done in spite of the process.” The
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (2007) specifies an evaluation be made to
determine the magnitude of the change required, and then the process be tailored
to address the issues appropriately. This approach promoted effectiveness to the
process as opposed to brainlessly following a process just to follow a process.
However, with any leniencies provided in a process, attention to thorough review,
communication, and execution of the negotiated, tailored process must always be
consciously exercised.
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Evidence showed a variation in formality within the SLS decision making
process. The initial contact with all the stakeholders was generally formal with a
10% to 17% amount of informality. More informality was evident in the
notification and communication at the Table Top / Task Team review level where
informality ranged between 17% and 32%. It seemed more appropriate for this
review level to be less formal. One observation was that the communication of
notification at this review level appeared to be less inclusive (depending on the
comments). For instance, if reviewers had no comments or had minor comments
such as editorials, then the reviewers were not always part of the discussions on
comment dispositions. This raised a flag indicating a potential communication
issue since approximately 25% were not involved in discussions of any impacts
stemming from the dis-positioned comments from the CR reviews. Some
respondents with no comments would not be included in the discussion, therefore,
missing a decision and/or impact discussions leading to the formulation of a
decision.
The overall process differed for each CR. One difference was in the array
of individuals with varying levels of knowledge, skills, interests, and workload
tasks assigned as reviewers. Secondly, the CR subject matter, data products,
control boards (i.e., CECB, PCB, JICB), and review periods varied amongst the
CRs due to project time constraints and other dependencies. Lastly, the process
differed with the institution of the new Task Team review concept for one CR
under study. In each case, the same decision making process was referenced for
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technical guidance but tailored to the specific CR need and decision maker
expertise.
Evidence showed that the same resources were expended for the three CRs
under study. A respondent shared, “Each organization tries to place those with
the most expertise on the CRs.” Additionally, most of the survey comments
suggested that lack of resources such as time and budget were the reason
additional expertise would have helped in the CR reviews. One respondent
commented that “there were always too many CRs in the system with too little
time to complete as one would like”. Other comments such as: “SMEs
are…overburdened with CR reviews”, “multiple changes…reviewed
simultaneously by the same experts”, and “never enough time to do it all” served
as a result of the overwhelming workload of many CRs in general, not due to a
specific CR.
Evidence showed cost and design/performance strongly influenced the
decisions. Those involved in the CR processing felt their contribution was value
added to the decision making and approval of the technical change. The survey
results revealed no more than 25% had no need to contribute. It appeared the SLS
Program would rather commit a type II error (i.e., asking a few more people to
comment who do not have a comment to make) than a type I error (i.e., that is
failing to ask someone who might have an appropriate comment).
All comments received during the CR reviews were deemed acceptably
dis-positioned. Most CR participants completely or moderately agreed with the
resulting decisions. In the case of CR53 there was one person who, while
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understanding the rationale for the decisions, thought there was a better
alternative that was less complex, cheaper in the long run to operate, and was
afraid the decision made was a short term and not the best long term decision. No
one disagreed completely.
The Reagan and Rohrbaugh (1990) study was referenced for the
evaluation of the decision making process and the resultant decisions from the
process to determine whether the SLS decision making process was goalcentered, adaptable, participatory, and data-based. The SLS decision making
process was adaptable and participatory; however, the process was not
consistently goal-centered or data-based across the CRs under study. When
reviewers did not know or understand the scope or intent of CR in review, then
the process was not adequately goal-centered. Similarly, when the magnitude of
the change was too much to process within a defined time constraint, then the
process was not adequately data-based. Were the resulting decisions efficient,
legitimate, supportable, and accountable? Evidence showed that no one
completely disagreed with the resulting decisions; therefore, the decisions were
considered efficient, legitimate, supportable, and accountable since procedural
rationality was applied to logically produce a necessary effect for each CR
change.
6.1.3

SLS Communication Effectiveness
Hackman (1990) theorized that three “enabling conditions” (i.e., sufficient

group effort, adequate knowledge and skills possessed by group members, and
appropriate performance in decision making strategies) exert positive influence on
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group performance through the mediation of communication and interactions.
Eikenberry (2005) theorized that individuals communicate the right information at
the right time in the right way to make an effective decision. Habermas (1998)
theorized that communication between people must be fulfilled to coordinate
actions effectively for the purpose of satisfying needs and employing an effective
decision making process. The question was, did the SLS disciplines meet these
communication guidelines for effective decision making? Evidence suggested the
CR reviews and resulting decisions appear to be well-vetted, understood by all,
and agreed to by the majority of the CR reviewers. The decisions seemed to also
be well-communicated to the Program Manager for approval; however, the
dissemination of the CR approvals were not so well-communicated to the
stakeholders and/or organizations. It was a disturbing result that 16% never
officially received notification of the approved CRs. The decision making process
needs improvement for proper dissemination of decisions.
Table Top and Task Team reviews were the mode of communication for
the CR processing. These reviews were face to face meetings with audio (i.e.,
teleconference) interactions. Per McGrath (1984), this hybrid mode is less
restrictive on communication and provides increased opportunity to exchange and
utilize information in arriving at solutions / decisions. Jarboe (1996) theorized
that group involvement in decision making increases the amount of information
available to the group, increases commitment to the decision, improves
dissemination of that decision, and increases the quality thought throughout the
process. While evidence suggested the decision making process to be effective,
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the communication was not a total positive influence in the process. Evidence
revealed 16% of the survey respondents never officially learned of the approved
CR decisions, indicating a communication gap within the process.
Communication within the decision formulation and determination appeared
adequate with the dissemination of the resulting decision lacking. This result
aligned with Eikenberry (2005) who theorized the widest gap in decision making
to be in communicating decisions.
The Constellation Program comprised a 10-Center team. Communication
was a documented challenge for that program. The SLS Program spans a smaller
grouping of integration efforts across 3-Centers; however, with respect to the CR
processing and decision making, communication exhibited challenges to the
Program. Evidence suggested that the decision making process was inefficient in
resource (i.e., time and workload) allocations and in communicating decisions.
6.2

Recommendations
The overall assessment of decision-making and communication as

evidenced by analysis of these 3 CRs was positive. The SLS Program has
improved and incorporated lessons learned from recent past programs. There are,
however, a few recommendations to be made which would further strengthen a
successful decision-making and communication process.
There is a need to include all involved parties in the discussion of the
comments. The mere fact that an individual did not have a comment was reason to
exclude the individual from the comment discussion. On the surface this seems
appropriate; however, there were respondents who mentioned that changes were

115

made to a CR during discussion of a comment which were not known to those not
included in the discussion. Involving all parties requires additional resources up
front but may solve issues in the long term.
The effectiveness of the decision process was hindered by the difference
between NASA’s schedule and external entities’ schedules. A decision making
approach that has NASA schedules more in synch its counterparts’ schedules
would facilitate needed changes and quick responses.
There were multiple comments about the workload within and across CRs.
The time and resources to review, understand, and completely assess all the CRs
was extremely limited. It was clear the SMEs felt the pressure to respond quickly
and thoroughly but acknowledged that this had the risk of overlooking a problem
or implementing a conservative answer and/or comment. Faster is not always
better.
Approximately 20% of the respondents never officially learned of the
approved CR decisions. Inefficient communication resulted in cost and schedule
impacts. Based on the communication issues, an establishment of a culmination
meeting at the end of the CR decision process to close the communication loop
would be beneficial.
There were concerns about individuals’ understanding, skill, and timing of
life cycle cost assessments. There is a need to train Cross Program personnel on
how and when to perform cost and schedule impact assessments within a review.
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6.3

Thesis Research Contribution
The culmination of this thesis research will contribute to the body of

knowledge by providing a better understanding of the decision making process
within the Systems Engineering discipline. Formal Systems Engineering
processes are documented, but the informal implementation of Systems
Engineering are not fully understood. While this thesis focused on the formal and
informal interactions and practices employed by the NASA Marshall Center to
investigate, collaborate, and negotiate viable strategic decisions within the SLS
Program, the knowledge and implementation of decision making and
communications captured within the thesis can be effectively applied to Systems
Engineering practices within any type of organization (i.e., government,
cooperate, academia, etc.).
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APPENDIX A

SURVEY ADMINISTRATION

Subject: Decision Analysis Survey
On behalf of Garry Lyles, your completion of the Decision Analysis Survey below is
greatly appreciated.
The University of Alabama in Huntsville is following 3 different Change Requests to
understand SLS decision making processes. One way to gather information to aide this
effort is by studying how each of these 3 CRs was introduced, discussed, approved and
then communicated. We would like to survey those involved in each of these CRs to
better understand the discussion patterns, the approval process and the resulting decision,
and communication of that decision. This is not a critique of the decision making
process, but a study to determine key drivers in decision making. We are trying to
identify aspects that strongly influenced the decisions made and those aspects which are
more flexible. The survey should take between 4 and 7 minutes to complete.
It has been placed on Survey Gizmo to protect anonymity. No names will be used in the
reporting of the data or conclusions. Please take a few minutes to complete the survey at
the link below for CR00070 or forward to your delegate for this CR as appropriate.
For Questions please contact: Karen Hicks at kch0039@uah.edu or Dawn Utley at
utleyd@uah.edu.
The survey can be found at the following link:
http://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/1349312/SYSTEMS-ENGINEERING-PROCESSESSURVEY-SLS-DECISION-PROCESS-FOR-CR-SLS-00070
Some of you may receive more than one survey based in your participation in the review
of the CRs selected for the survey. If so, please fill out a separate survey for each CR in
which you were involved.
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APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Change Request (CR) SLS-00XX Review
1

Who (person or group) generated the CR?

2

How were you notified of this CR for
assessment? (Check one.)

3
4
5

If ‘Other’ checked above, please elaborate.
What was your motivation in reviewing this
CR?
Do you believe you provided a needed
contribution to the CR assessment? (Check
one.)

6

Would the assessment have benefited from
additional expertise or input? (Check one.)

7

If ‘Yes’ above, what expertise would have
improved the CR assessment?

8

Do you feel you had adequate time and/or
readily available CR related materials to
perform an assessment of this CR? (Check

☐ Direct
email to
review

☐ Email from
DLE / EDLE to
review

☐ Verbal from
DLE / EDLE to
review

☐ No. I did not need to
contribute to this CR and had
no comments.

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Yes

☐ Other

one.)

9
10

11

If ‘No’ above, what hindered your review?
If your answer to Question 5 was ‘No’, then
skip to Question 11; otherwise, how do you
feel your comments were received and
dispositioned? (Check one.)
Were you involved in the discussion of any
impacts stemming from the dispositioned
comments from the review of the CR?

☐ Well.
Lots of discussion to
make my comments
understood
☐ No, not at all

(Check one.)

12
13
14
15
16
17

If ‘No’, please explain. Then skip to
Question 17.
If ‘Yes’ in Question 11, how were you
notified of the Tabletop or Task Team
Review for this CR? (Check one.)
If ‘Other’ checked above, please provide
info.
Do you think your comments were assessed
adequately in the Tabletop or Task Team
Review process? (Check one.)
If ‘No’ above, please explain.
When did the decision / approval of the CR
officially get to you (approximate mm, yy)
or NEVER?

☐ Direct
email to
review

☐ Email from
DLE / EDLE to
review

☐ No
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☐ Fair.
Minimal
communication
(mainly via email)
☐ Yes, informally
(i.e., through DLE,
EDLE, LSE, CE,
etc.)

☐ Poor.
My comments were
ignored or dismissed
☐ Yes, formally via
direct Table Top /
Task Team / Control
Board Review(s)

☐ Verbal from
DLE / EDLE to
review

☐ Yes

☐ Other

18
19

20

21

Did you fully understand the CR decision
☐ No
☐ Yes
and its implementation plan? (Check one.)
If ‘No’ above, what would have aided your
understanding?
To what degree did you agree with the decision? (Check one and provide any comments.)
☐ Not at all (0%)
☐ Disagreed
☐ Ambivalent
☐ Moderately
☐ Completely Comments?
but understood
and workable
agree (80%)
agree (100%)
rationale (30%)
(50%)
In your opinion how were the following attributes used in making the final decision of this CR? Rank the attributes.
(where 0=Not Considered, 1=Top Priority, 2=Second Priority, etc in a pull-down menu).
Click to select a rank

Design/Performan
ce

Click to select a
rank

Click to select a
rank

Click to select a
rank

Cost

Schedule

Risk

Click to select a rank

Other: _________________

Communication
22

Were there any gaps in communication during the CR
review? (Check one.)

23

If ‘Yes', what were they?

24

Were there cost or schedule impacts due to
communication glitches during the CR review? (Check

☐ No

☐ Yes, minor

☐ Yes, major

☐ No

☐ Yes, minor

☐ Yes, major

one.)

25

If ‘Yes’, what were they?

Overall Assessment of the CR Decision-Making Process
26

From your perspective, were your concerns with this CR dealt with effectively? (Check one and provide any comments.)
Comments?
☐ No, not at all
☐ Somewhat
☐ Acceptable
☐ Moderately
☐ Highly
but not
effective
effective
adequately
From your perspective, how would you describe the decision process with respect to this CR? (Check one and provide any
comments.)

27

☐ Very difficult
and/or frustrating
and not effective

☐ Difficult and
somewhat
effective

☐ Effective but
inefficient

28

If you have anything you would like to share about this
CR review, please do so here.

120

☐ Sufficiently
effective and
somewhat
inefficient

☐ Highly
effective and
very efficient

Comments?

APPENDIX C
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